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INTEGRATING INDIGENOUS RIGHTS INTO 
MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
AGREEMENTS: THE INTERNATIONAL 
WHALING COMMISSION AND 
ABORIGINAL SUBSISTENCE WHALING 
CHRIS WOLD* 
Abstract: Although the international community has addressed whether envi-
ronmental harm violates human rights norms, only recently has it asked whether 
international organizations must implement those norms. That changed when 
Greenland posited that the International Whaling Commission (IWC) has a duty 
to implement aboriginal subsistence whaling (ASW) in light of customary inter-
national human rights norms, including the rights to cultural identity and re-
sources. This article explains why international organizations have an obligation 
to implement customary international human rights law. Implementation, howev-
er, may be challenging because the content of some rights is not clear. In addi-
tion, these rights are not absolute. Actions may interfere with human rights pro-
vided they can be reasonably and objectively justified, as the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee has concluded, or are necessary, legitimate, and pro-
portional, as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has stated. The article 
concludes that the IWC’s ASW management regime interferes with certain cus-
tomary international human rights, but that it can be reasonably and objectively 
justified or is necessary, legitimate, and proportional. Nonetheless, the IWC 
could strengthen implementation of human rights by, for example, clearly articu-
lating criteria for preparing and evaluating “need statements”—the statements 
submitted to support an ASW quota. 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, scholars and international commissions have paid increas-
ing attention to the question of whether certain environmental harms constitute 
violations of human rights norms and who might be responsible for such 
harm.1 Others have looked at these questions in the specific context of indige-
                                                                                                                           
 © 2017, Chris Wold. All rights reserved. 
 * Professor of Law and Director, International Environmental Law Project (IELP), Lewis & 
Clark Law School. He thanks Ethan Bodegan, Samantha Javier, and Sera Song for their excellent 
research and drafting of some sections of this report. He also thanks Erica Lyman for her valuable and 
insightful comments. 
 1 See, e.g., Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Issue of Human 
Rights Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment, 
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nous peoples.2 Even with respect to global environmental problems that may 
affect human rights, such as climate change, the questions have focused on 
how the human rights regime can complement and support international envi-
ronmental discussions.3 
The need to protect the environment as a prerequisite for protecting fun-
damental human rights, such as rights to food, water, health, property, and cul-
ture, is widely recognized.4 Nonetheless, few are asking whether the interna-
tional environmental institutions themselves have responsibilities to incorpo-
rate human rights into their decisions and programs of work. This is beginning 
to change. For example, the International Whaling Commission (IWC)5 has 
begun exploring how to incorporate indigenous human rights in the context of 
aboriginal subsistence whaling (ASW).6 At their most recent meeting, the par-
ties to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
Fauna and Flora (CITES)7 established a working group to consider whether “to 
take into account the need for inter alia, food and nutrition security, preserva-
                                                                                                                           
¶ 72, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/52 (2016) (concluding that “climate change threatens the enjoyment of a 
vast range of human rights”). 
 2 See, e.g., U.N. Env’t Programme [UNEP], Climate Change and Human Rights (2015), http://
web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/climate-change/climate_change_and_human_
rights.pdf [https://perma.cc/38QM-E283]. 
 3 See, e.g., Marc Limon, Human Rights and Climate Change: Constructing a Case for Political 
Action, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 439 (2009). 
 4 See, e.g., id.; Human Rights Council Res. 10/4 Human Rights and Climate Change, U.N. Doc 
A/HRC/10/L.11, at 15 (Mar. 25, 2009) (“Noting that climate change-related impacts have a range of 
implications, both direct and indirect, for the effective enjoyment of human rights including, inter alia, 
the right to life, the right to adequate food, the right to the highest attainable standard of health, the 
right to adequate housing, the right to self-determination and human rights obligations related to ac-
cess to safe drinking water and sanitation, and recalling that in no case may a people be deprived of its 
own means of subsistence.”). 
 5 The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) established the Interna-
tional Whaling Commission (IWC). International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling art. 
III(1), Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, 161 U.N.T.S. 72 (entered into force Nov. 10, 1948) [hereinafter 
ICRW]. The schedule, which includes the rules for whaling, is an integral part of the ICRW. Id. art. 
I(1). The schedule was last amended at the Sixty-fifth Annual Meeting of the IWC in September 2014. 
At the moment, however, the IWC’s website only provides a link to the schedule as amended in 2012. 
See International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, 1946: Schedule as Amended by the 
Commission at the 65th Meeting (2014) [hereinafter Schedule]. The 2014 amendments can be found 
in Int’l Whaling Comm’n [IWC], Summary of Main Outcomes, Decisions and Required Actions from 
the 65th Meeting, at 6 (Sept. 18, 2014), http://iwc.int/iwc65docs [https://perma.cc/23CN-5BBS]. 
 6 See, e.g., Int’l Whaling Comm’n, Report of the IWC Expert Workshop on Aboriginal Subsist-
ence Whaling (ASW), § 2.2, IWC/66/ASW Rep01 (2015), https://archive.iwc.int/pages/view.php?
ref=5664&k= [https://perma.cc/MM9N-N2N5] [hereinafter Int’l Whaling Comm’n, Report of the 
IWC Expert Workshop on ASW]. 
 7 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 
1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 (entered into force July 1, 1975) [hereinafter CITES]. 
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tion of cultural identity and security of livelihoods” when making decisions to 
protect species.8 
The IWC’s support for ASW9 and its rejection of an ASW quota for 
Greenland in 201210 underscore the tension faced by many international envi-
ronmental organizations as they simultaneously attempt to implement indige-
nous rights and achieve their environmental or conservation goals. Recogniz-
ing the complexity of these issues, the IWC held an expert workshop to discuss 
them,11 particularly in the context of “need statements,”12 the document sub-
mitted by IWC Members on behalf of their indigenous peoples to support an 
ASW quota.13 The workshop participants described how the rights to 1) self-
determination; 2) land, territories, and resources; and 3) cultural integrity of 
indigenous peoples should inform how the IWC approaches ASW.14 None of 
                                                                                                                           
 8 Conference of the Parties to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of 
Flora and Fauna, Draft Resolution on Livelihoods and Food Security, at 2, CoP17 Doc. 17 (2016), 
https://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/cop/17/WorkingDocs/E-CoP17-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/2AB9-
Z6T2]. 
 9 See Schedule, supra note 5, ¶ 13; Greg Donovan, Some Thoughts on Facilitating the Process to 
Agree Catch Limits for Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling (ASW): An Update of IWC/63/13, at 1, 
IWC/S15/ASW/4 Rev1 (Oct. 15, 2015), https://archive.iwc.int/pages/view.php?ref=5676&search=%
21collection1573&order_by=relevance&sort=DESC&offset=0&archive=0&k=&curpos=3&restypes= 
[https://perma.cc/98YF-EF8C] (describing the process for approving ASW quotas at IWC annual 
meetings); Int’l Whaling Comm’n, Report of the Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling Working Group, 
app. 5, at 15, IWC/64/ASW5 Rev1 (May 28, 2012), https://iwc.int/private/downloads/6tHTVD
kxoYwGaRhtHlXm8Q/64-ASW%205%20Rev1%20-%20with%20Appendices.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8K4J-258D] (describing the history of ASW). 
 10 See Press Release, Int’l Whaling Comm’n, Press Release: Day 4 (2014), https://archive.
iwc.int/pages/view.php?ref=3476&search=press%2C+release&order_by=relevance&sort=DESC&
offset=0&archive=0&k=&curpos=0 [https://perma.cc/R7Q5-VCD3] (discussing the impasse within 
the IWC over Greenland with a vote of twenty-five in favor, thirty-four against, and three absten-
tions). 
 11 See Int’l Whaling Comm’n, Chair’s Report from Ad Hoc Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling Work-
ing Group Meeting with Native Hunters, app. 2, at 6, IWC/65/ASWRep01 Rev1 (Sept. 12, 2014), 
https://archive.iwc.int/pages/view.php?ref=3540&search=%21collection98&order_by=relevance
&sort=DESC&offset=0&archive=0&k=..&curpos=3&restypes= [https://perma.cc/G8C7-B5SV] [here-
inafter IWC, Chair’s Report from ASW Working Group Meeting]. 
 12 Id. (stating that “an important focus [of the workshop] must be on consideration of ‘need 
statements’ in the broad sense”). 
 13 See infra Section II (discussing the origins of need statements). 
 14 See Dalee Sambo Dorough, Presentation on: The Arctic Council and its Recent Initiatives; and 
the International Human Rights Standards Specifically Responsive to the Distinct Cultural Context of 
Indigenous Peoples (Sept. 15, 2015), https://archive.iwc.int/pages/view.php?ref=5675&search=%21
collection1573&order_by=relevance&sort=DESC&offset=0&archive=0&k=&curpos=4&restypes= 
[https://perma.cc/Y53Q-6768]; Jessica Lefevre, Subsistence Whaling Through the Lens of Interna-
tional Human Rights (2015), https://archive.iwc.int/pages/view.php?ref=5674&search=%21collection
1573&order_by=relevance&sort=DESC&offset=0&archive=0&k=&curpos=5&restypes= [https://
perma.cc/8TQL-J2F4]; Martin Mennecke, The Relevance of International Law “Outside” the ICRW 
for the IWC, at 1 (2015), https://archive.iwc.int/pages/view.php?ref=5673&search=%21collection
1573&order_by=relevance&sort=DESC&offset=0&archive=0&k=&curpos=6&restypes= [https://
perma.cc/UVQ3-E7QC]; Elsa Stamatopoulou, Presentation on: A. Subsistence Rights as Part of In-
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them, however, provided a clear framework for how the IWC should imple-
ment ASW in light of the IWC’s duty to manage whale stocks globally. In-
stead, they indicated that the IWC’s decision-making process should be revised 
to take account of these rights. Equally significant, none of the participants 
presented compelling legal arguments explaining why human rights obliga-
tions apply to international organizations. 
This article assesses the legal status of indigenous rights in international 
law and explains why international organizations such as the IWC have a legal 
obligation to implement those indigenous and other human rights that have 
become customary international law. Section II begins by summarizing the 
history of ASW management by the IWC, as well as the reasons for the IWC’s 
rejection of Greenland’s ASW quota in 2012. Section III evaluates the status 
and content of the right to self-determination, the right to cultural identity, and 
the right to lands, territories, and resources. Notably, it concludes that while 
these rights are or will become customary international law, they are not abso-
lute; states and international organizations may interfere with these rights so 
long as they do not infringe them. As the United Nations Human Rights Com-
mittee (Human Rights Committee or Committee)15 has stated, actions may af-
fect human rights provided that those actions are subject to “reasonable and 
objective justification.”16 Section IV concludes that customary international 
law binds international organizations such as the IWC either directly because 
they possess international legal personality or indirectly because the individual 
member states composing the international organization have responsibilities 
to implement them. While international organizations cannot derogate from jus 
cogens norms, they can create rules that derogate from non-jus cogens norms; 
none of the human rights norms discussed in this report have attained the status 
of jus cogens. Section V concludes that the IWC’s current management regime 
for ASW can be reasonably and objectively justified and does not need to be 
changed. Nonetheless, the IWC could take steps to strengthen implementation 
of human rights by, for example, clearly articulating criteria for preparing and 
evaluating need statements. 
                                                                                                                           
digenous Peoples Cultural Human Rights; B. Subsistence Rights as Part of the New Development 
Paradigm; and C. Some Policy Conclusions and Recommendations, at 3 (Sept. 14–18, 2015), https://
archive.iwc.int/pages/view.php?ref=5672&search=%21collection1573&order_by=relevance&sort=
DESC&offset=0&archive=0&k=&curpos=7&restypes= [https://perma.cc/67RW-7PQT]. 
 15 The Human Rights Committee oversees the state parties’ implementation of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See Monitoring Civil and Political Rights, UNITED NATIONS 
HUM. RTS.: OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/CCPR
Index.aspx [https://perma.cc/CW68-FWCE]. 
 16 Lovelace v. Canada, Human Rights Committee, Comm. No. R.6/24, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. A/36/40 
(1981). 
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I. ASW IN THE IWC 
The IWC has long recognized the importance of ASW for certain aborigi-
nal groups. During the drafting of the International Convention for the Regula-
tion of Whaling (ICRW) in 1946, negotiators from Canada and the Soviet Un-
ion complained that the ICRW did not include an exception for ASW.17 As a 
consequence, negotiators included a formal statement in the ICRW’s Final Act 
supporting the continued taking of gray whales in the Bering and Chukchi 
Seas, provided the meat and other products were used “exclusively for local 
consumption by the aborigines of the Chokotsk and Korjaksk areas.”18 They 
also included a provision in the initial Schedule, the IWC’s binding set of regu-
lations, exempting the killing of gray and right (also known as bowhead) 
whales from a whaling ban, provided the meat and other products were used 
exclusively for local consumption by aborigines.19 
From 1948 to 1961, ASW occurred under these basic provisions. In 1961, 
when the IWC started limiting the killing of humpback whales, it expanded the 
ASW exception by allowing Greenlanders to continue killing up to ten hump-
back whales annually.20 In 1964, the IWC amended the schedule to allow a 
government to kill gray and right whales on behalf of aborigines, provided that 
the meat and other whale products were used “exclusively for local consump-
tion by the aborigines.”21 
From its inception, then, the ICRW and the IWC have recognized the im-
portant role that whale products play in the nutritional and cultural life of some 
indigenous peoples.22 At the same time, the ICRW and the IWC have allowed 
ASW to occur despite growing restrictions on other forms of whaling. In other 
words, they have treated ASW as an exception by limiting the number of 
                                                                                                                           
 17 See generally Michael F. Tillman, The International Management of Aboriginal Whaling, 16 
REVIEWS FISHERIES SCI. 437, 438 (2008) (providing an excellent overview of the early years of 
ASW). They also made clear that restricting aborigines to “traditional” methods, such as hunting in 
canoes without firearms, was unacceptable due to challenging Arctic conditions. Id. 
 18 See id. at 438–39 (quoting from the Final Act of the Washington Conference at which negotiat-
ing states adopted the ICRW). 
 19 Id. at 439. 
 20 See Int’l Whaling Comm’n, Chairman’s Report of the Twelfth Meeting, 12 REP. INT’L WHAL-
ING COMMISSION 14, 31 app. III (1961) (finding nothing wrong with a proposal to allow the killing of 
ten humpback whales for local consumption in Greenland). 
 21 Int’l Whaling Comm’n, Chairman’s Report of the Sixteenth Meeting, Including the Amend-
ments to the Schedule of the International Whaling Convention, 1946, Made at That Meeting, 16 REP. 
INT’L WHALING COMMISSION 15, 20 app. III (1966). 
 22 See Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling, INT’L WHALING COMMISSION, http://iwc.int/aboriginal 
[https://perma.cc/M8P7-CPYM] (noting that the two major objectives of IWC regulation of ASW are 
to maintain healthy populations of whale and to allow aboriginal groups to maintain cultural practices 
of whaling). 
68 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 40:63 
whales that may be killed based on the specific needs of specific indigenous 
groups.23 
ASW is now enshrined in paragraph 13 of the schedule. Notwithstanding 
the provisions applicable to commercial whaling, the IWC may approve ASW 
quotas “to satisfy aboriginal subsistence need” provided that certain conditions 
are met.24 In addition to ensuring that ASW is sustainable and the relevant 
IWC member has national legislation to regulate ASW, paragraph 13 also re-
quires that any meat and products of such whales be used exclusively for local 
consumption by the aborigines.25 
Nonetheless, the IWC’s approval of ASW quotas has sometimes met re-
sistance. For example, some IWC members have challenged Greenland’s re-
quest for fin and humpback whales26 as well as the taking of humpback whales 
in St. Vincent and the Grenadines.27 However, the ASW debate significantly 
intensified in 2012 when the IWC rejected Greenland’s request for an ASW 
quota starting with the 2013 season.28 IWC members expressed concerns over 
the size of the quota, Greenland’s conversion factors used to calculate the yield 
of meat from each whale, and evidence of the commercial sale of whale meat, 
including in restaurants.29 
In the wake of that rejection, Greenland unilaterally established ASW 
quotas for 2013 and 2014 and allowed the 2013 hunt to go forward.30 Although 
                                                                                                                           
 23 See Chris Wold & Michael Kearney, The Legal Effect of Greenland’s Unilateral Aboriginal 
Subsistence Whale Hunt, 30 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 561, 583–85 (2015). 
 24 Schedule, supra note 5, ¶ 13(a). 
 25 See id. ¶ 13(b). 
 26 In 2008, the IWC rejected Greenland’s proposal to add humpback whales to its ASW quota. 
See Int’l Whaling Comm’n, Chair’s Report of the 61st Annual Meeting, 2009 ANN. REP. INT’L WHAL-
ING COMMISSION 5, 22–24. In 2010, Greenland’s ASW quota was approved only after Greenland 
agreed to reduce the number of fin whales and humpback whales killed for aboriginal subsistence 
purposes in its proposal. See Int’l Whaling Comm’n, Chair’s Report of the 62nd Annual Meeting, 
2010 ANN. REP. INT’L WHALING COMMISSION 5, 17. 
 27 A frequent concern of the IWC is the ongoing killing of what many consider to be calves by 
those engaged in ASW in St. Vincent and the Grenadines. See, e.g., Int’l Whaling Comm’n, Chair-
man’s Report of the Fifty-Second Annual Meeting, 2000 ANN. REP. INT’L WHALING COMMISSION 11, 
18–19; see also Whale & Dolphin Conservation Soc’y, Analysis of the Reports of the IWC’s Infrac-
tion Sub-Committee from 1991 to 2004: Review of Compliance at the IWC (June 2005) (reviewing the 
history of attempts to label this killing as an infraction). 
 28 See Press Release, Int’l Whaling Comm’n, supra note 10. 
 29 See Int’l Whaling Comm’n, Chair’s Report of the 64th Annual Meeting, 2012 ANN. REP. INT’L 
WHALING COMMISSION 7, 22–23 (describing concern from Brazil, Ecuador, and Argentina over 
Greenland’s ASW whaling practices). For a detailed description of the factual and legal issues sur-
rounding the IWC’s rejection of Greenland’s ASW quota and Greenland’s subsequent unilateral deci-
sion to conduct ASW in the absence of an IWC-approved quota, see Wold & Kearney, supra note 23. 
 30 See Int’l Whaling Comm’n, Chair’s Report of the 65th Meeting, 2014 ANN. REP. INT’L WHALING 
COMMISSION 7, 30–31; see also Whale Quotas Create Rift Between Greenland and Denmark, COPEN-
HAGEN POST (July 11, 2013, 3:59 PM), http://cphpost.dk/news/whale-quotas-create-rift-between-
greenland-and-denmark.5962.html [https://perma.cc/AL4H-ZUA2]. Prior to establishing its unilateral 
quota, Greenland solicited comments from IWC Members on its proposal to allocate ASW quotas to 
2017] Indigenous Rights and the IWC’s Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling Regime 69 
some IWC members supported Greenland’s unilateral hunt,31 other members 
argued that Greenland was precluded from conducting ASW until the IWC 
approved a new quota.32 Greenland submitted a new ASW proposal to the IWC 
                                                                                                                           
itself for 2013 and 2014, without IWC approval. See Letter from Jens K. Lyberth, Deputy Minister, 
Green. Ministry of Fisheries, Hunting, & Agric., to IWC Comm’rs, Regarding Greenland Quotas on 
Large Whales (Nov. 30, 2012) (on file with author). 
 31 In an email, the Acting IWC Commissioner for the United States said the following: 
 Denmark/Greenland is now considering issuing catch limits for the years 2013 and 
2014 at the same levels that Denmark proposed in Panama. The United States supports 
catch limits that are consistent with a documented needs statement and that are support-
ed by advice of the IWC Scientific Committee. If Denmark/Greenland were to issue 
catch limits for 2013 and 2014 at the same levels as their 2012 catch limits, it would 
likely garner wider support within the IWC and create a more positive atmosphere at 
IWC65. Further, we support Denmark/Greenland’s intention to propose a new schedule 
amendment to the IWC in 2014 for catch limits through 2018. 
E-mail from Ryan Wulff, Acting U.S. IWC Comm’r, to Gitte Hundaul, Den. Comm’r to the IWC, and 
Jens K. Lyberth, Deputy Minister, Green. Ministry of Fisheries, Hunting, & Agric. (Dec. 14, 2012) 
(on file with author); see also NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC 
ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR ISSUING 
ANNUAL QUOTAS TO THE ALASKA ESKIMO WHALING COMMISSION FOR A SUBSISTENCE HUNT ON 
BOWHEAD WHALES FOR THE YEARS 2013 THROUGH 2017/2018, at 1 (June 2012) (“It is possible that 
the IWC might not update the catch limit, notwithstanding IWC Scientific Committee management 
advice that the hunt is sustainable. If so, it should be noted that NOAA is considering issuing annual 
quotas for the time periods described in the Alternatives under the current IWC Schedule language”). 
At the IWC’s 2012 meeting and as reported in the Chairman’s report, St. Lucia commented: 
[T]he proposed Schedule amendment had not been for a zero quota, but instead was for 
a specific quota. Given that the previous quota was expired, it commented that what the 
Commission had actually said to Denmark/Greenland was to go forth and manage their 
fishery on their own. It considered that whaling would continue despite the outcome of 
the vote because the outcome effectively meant no quota advice was given. 
Int’l Whaling Comm’n, Chair’s Report of the 64th Annual Meeting, supra note 29, at 23. 
 32 See Letter from Donna Petrachenko, Austl.’s Comm’r to the IWC, to Gitte Hundahl, Den.’s 
Comm’r to the IWC (Dec. 17, 2012), iwc.int/document_3159.download [https://perma.cc/52WP-
CCCC] (objecting to Greenland’s proposal). On behalf of EU IWC commissioners from EU member 
states, the IWC Commissioner for Cyprus wrote: 
 Cyprus had already expressed, on behalf of the above-listed EU IWC Commission-
ers, the coordinated position on the proposal submitted by Denmark (Greenland) at 
IWC 64 in Panama, in July of this year. As we had stated on that occasion, we were 
ready to support a roll-over proposal from Greenland, just as we supported the other, 
joint, proposal submitted to the IWC by the USA, Russia and St. Vincent and the Gren-
adines. At this stage, I am compelled to inform you that this position remains unaltered 
and that, consequently, we remain unable to support your suggested approach.  
 We would also be interested to understand how you, together with the Government 
of Denmark, would see the next steps unfolding, particularly in the light of the IWC 
Rules of Procedure and the possibility of making use of IWC Rule E.4, considering that 
the next IWC meeting will take place in 2014. 
Letter from Myroula Hadjichristoforou, IWC Comm’r for Cyprus, to Jens K. Lyberth, Deputy Minis-
ter, Green. Ministry of Fisheries, Hunting, & Agric. (Dec. 14, 2012) (on file with author); see also 
2014 IWC 65 Meeting in Slovenia, ANIMAL WELFARE INST., https://awionline.org/content/2014-iwc-
70 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 40:63 
in 2014 for 2014 through 2018, which the IWC adopted.33 At the same meet-
ing, several IWC members called on the IWC to declare Greenland’s 2013 and 
2014 whaling an infraction34 that Denmark, which ratified the ICRW on 
Greenland’s behalf,35 must prosecute and punish.36 Clearly, the issue was not 
resolved to the satisfaction of many IWC members. 
Recognizing the complexity of the topics involved in ASW and the need 
to revise the process for approving ASW quotas, the IWC agreed in 2014 to 
hold an expert workshop to improve long-term management of ASW.37 The 
IWC drafted the terms of reference for the workshop broadly to address a 
range of issues affecting ASW, but it intended the workshop to focus on need 
                                                                                                                           
65-meeting-slovenia [https://perma.cc/MM6R-PST7] (providing that at the IWC’s 2014 meeting, 
Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and other members of the Latin American group of countries known as the 
Buenos Aires Group stated that Denmark’s failure to report Greenland’s ASW as commercial whaling 
constituted an infraction). Even Denmark seemed to take this position. See Whales Quotas Create Rift 
Between Greenland and Denmark, supra note 30 (reporting that “[t]he Danish government argues that 
by setting its own independent quota, Greenland is contravening IWC regulations”). Denmark also 
said it would have to withdraw from the IWC as a result of Greenland’s ASW hunt. Id. 
 33 See Int’l Whaling Comm’n, Summary of Main Outcomes, supra note 5, at 6 (amending the 
schedule to allow ASW). The schedule amendment for Greenland’s quota achieved the necessary 
three-fourths majority with forty-six members voting “yes,” eleven members voting “no,” and three 
members abstaining. See Int’l Whaling Comm’n, Status of Agenda Items at IWC/65 as of Monday, 15 
September 2014, IWC/65/Status, at 1–2 (2014), https://archive.iwc.int/pages/view.php?ref=3577 
[https://perma.cc/4VYS-5TNR]. Greenland’s 2014 proposal differed from its 2012 proposal by just 
twelve minke whales. See Denmark, Proposed Schedule Amendment (IWC 64) (Greenland Catch 
limits), IWC/64/12, at 1 (2012), https://iwc.int/private/downloads/wZY8vPNeplVotBRS6w4Jiw/64-
12.pdf [https://perma.cc/DVD6-7ZVC] (providing that the number of minke whales struck from the 
Central stock and West Greenland stock shall not exceed twelve and 178 respectively for the years 
2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018). 
 34 See Int’l Whaling Comm’n, Report of the Infractions Sub-Committee, IWC/65/Rep04, at 2 
(Sept. 11, 2014), https://archive.iwc.int/pages/view.php?ref=3580 [https://perma.cc/23RN-QZRJ]. 
 35 Greenland is an autonomous territory within Denmark. When Denmark ratified the ICRW, it 
did so implicitly on behalf of Greenland. Denmark’s instrument of ratification does not explicitly state 
that Denmark is ratifying on behalf of Greenland. See Email from Francis J. Holleran, Depositary 
Officer, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Chris Wold, Professor, Lewis & Clark Law School (Sept. 15, 2006) 
(on file with author) (providing the English translation of the Declaration of the Kingdom of Denmark 
of Accession to the International Convention on the Regulation of Whaling). However, Lord McNair, 
a renowned international law scholar, has stated that when a treaty does not include a territorial appli-
cation clause, “the treaty applies to all the territory of the contracting party, whether metropolitan or 
not” unless a government expressly indicates otherwise. LORD MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 116–
17 (1961). This rule was codified in the Vienna Convention, which states that “[u]nless a different 
intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, a treaty is binding upon each party in 
respect of its entire territory.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 29, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. As the ICRW does 
not include any provisions for applying the convention to territories, the general rule applies. 
 36 See ICRW, supra note 5, art. IX (requiring prosecution and punishment of infractions by the 
“government having jurisdiction over the offence” and a requirement to report infractions and actions 
taken to the IWC). 
 37 See IWC, Chair’s Report from ASW Working Group Meeting, supra note 11, at 4 (charging 
the United States, Denmark, and the IWC’s Head of Science with developing a proposal for a work-
shop “to address those long term issues that are of greatest concern” for ASW). 
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statements,38 including “types of subsistence need (for example, cultural and 
nutritional); cultural and sociological variation across whaling communities 
with regard to conditions of the hunt and methods of distributing products, in-
cluding changes over time; methods used to present information on need to the 
Commission in an informative manner; consideration of approaches to objec-
tively review ‘need statements’ presented to the Commission; and food securi-
ty considerations.”39 Although not included among the named topics to be con-
sidered, an assessment of human rights law as it relates to ASW became a very 
significant focus of the workshop.40 
Several participants spoke on the need to incorporate human rights related 
cultural and subsistence issues within the context of ASW. In particular, they 
focused on the need to view ASW in relation to the economic, social, cultural, 
political, and spiritual dimensions of indigenous peoples’ rights.41 Such a need, 
they claimed, is consistent with the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention 
(more commonly known as ILO Convention 169)42 and the United Nations 
Declaration on Indigenous Rights (UNDRIP).43 Article 23(1) of ILO Conven-
tion 169, in particular, “affirms the linkage between culture, subsistence econ-
omy, economic self-reliance, and sustainable and equitable development”44 by 
providing that: 
Handicrafts, rural and community-based industries, and subsistence 
economy and traditional activities of the peoples concerned, such as 
hunting, fishing, trapping and gathering, shall be recognised as im-
portant factors in the maintenance of their cultures and in their eco-
nomic self-reliance and development. Governments shall, with the 
participation of these people and whenever appropriate, ensure that 
these activities are strengthened and promoted.45 
From this uncontroversial premise, the workshop participants then highlighted 
the rights of indigenous peoples to their own means of subsistence and tradi-
tional economies; to develop and use their lands, territories, and resources; to 
                                                                                                                           
 38 See IWC, Chair’s Report from ASW Working Group Meeting, supra note 11, app. 2, at 6 (stat-
ing that “an important focus must be on consideration of ‘need statements’ in the broad sense”). 
 39 See id; see also Int’l Whaling Comm’n, Report of the IWC Expert Workshop on ASW, supra 
note 6, § 2.2. 
 40 See Int’l Whaling Comm’n, Report of the IWC Expert Workshop on ASW, supra note 6, § 3.1. 
 41 See, e.g., Dorough, supra note 14, at 1 (stating that “[t]he main point of [her] presentation is the 
need to view Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling in relation with all of the other economic, social, cultur-
al, political and spiritual dimensions of Arctic Indigenous peoples’ rights”). 
 42 See Convention (No. 169) Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Coun-
tries, June 27, 1989, 1650 U.N.T.S. 383 [hereinafter ILO Convention 169]. 
 43 See G.A. Res. 61/295, annex, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter UNDRIP]. 
 44 Dorough, supra note 14, at 4. 
 45 ILO Convention 169, supra note 42, art. 23(1). 
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self-determination; and to cultural integrity.46 Importantly, they also acknowl-
edged that indigenous societies can evolve, but that does not make these socie-
ties any less indigenous or diminish their rights.47 
Despite concluding that these rights are customary international law,48 
they did not make a credible legal claim that the IWC, as an international or-
ganization, had the duty to implement these rights.49 Nor did they propose 
concrete ideas for how the IWC might incorporate these rights. Dalee Sambo 
Dorough “urge[ed] the members of the ASW working group and the IWC . . . 
to apprise themselves of these legally-binding provisions and to incorporate 
them into all of their future work.”50 More concretely, she called for the IWC 
to create, with the direct participation of indigenous peoples, more robust 
standards to protect ASW.51 Elsa Stamatopoulou concluded that the “IWC 
could consider joining the 40-some intergovernmental entities of the Inter-
                                                                                                                           
 46 Dorough, supra note 14, at 5–6; Lefevre, supra note 14, at 2–4, 6, 8 (stating that “[i]t is the 
right of all people, in community with others, to engage in economic and social activities which are 
part of the culture of the community to which they belong” and that the right to culture and to engage 
in economic activities inter-relates with the right of a people not to be deprived of its own means of 
subsistence); Stamatopoulou, supra note 14, at 5–7. 
 47 Dorough, supra note 14, at 7–8. 
 48 See id. at 6–7. 
 49 One participant emphasized aspects of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties relating 
to interpretation of a treaty in light of the treaty’s context. Mennecke, supra note 14, at 6, 8–10. Pur-
suant to Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention, “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in ac-
cordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the 
light of its object and purpose.” Vienna Convention, supra note 35, art. 31(1) (emphasis added). He 
argued that the IWC has a duty to interpret terms in the ICRW in light of human rights law because 
human rights law has become part of the context for interpreting the ICRW; because treaties such as 
the ICRW must be interpreted as evolving instruments, as opposed to the drafters’ intent, human 
rights norms that are customary international law have become part of the context upon which the 
terms of the ICRW should be interpreted. See Mennecke, supra note 14, at 6, 8–10. However, the 
Vienna Convention limits “context” to agreements relating to the treaty made between all parties in 
connection with the conclusion of the treaty or an instrument made by one or more parties in connec-
tion with the conclusion of a treaty and accepted by other parties to the treaty. Vienna Convention, 
supra note 35, art. 31. Human rights law, as reflected in customary international law, does not fall 
within either of these categories. As described in Section IV, however, valid legal arguments can be 
made that impose obligations on international organizations directly or indirectly. See infra Section 
IV. 
 50 Dorough, supra note 14, at 4. 
 51 Id. at 10. Dorough’s exact words are: 
 In regard to the IWC and its future actions, especially in light of climate change, 
there is a greater urgency to protect Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling and a greater ur-
gency to establish robust standards to do so. To assist in the preparation of such stand-
ards, the direct participation of Inuit [and other Indigenous peoples concerned] must be 
recognized and respected. In this way, the IWC will help to ensure the future of Aborig-
inal Subsistence Whaling in the Arctic and elsewhere, in a manner that upholds the 
fundamental human rights of Indigenous peoples and is consistent with their distinct 
cultural context. 
Id. (alteration in original). 
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Agency Support Group on Indigenous Issues in order to share experiences and 
good practices with others at [The Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues] and 
at other levels.”52 The workshop report includes as a main recommendation the 
need for IWC members “to reflect the specific status and human rights of In-
digenous peoples in their application and interpretation of the ASW framework 
under the International Convention on the Regulation of Whaling.”53 The 
workshop report, like the presentations, does not articulate how the IWC 
should do that. 
II. HUMAN RIGHTS CLAIMS RELEVANT TO INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 
The IWC’s expert workshop helped raise the issue of the need for interna-
tional organizations such as the IWC to consider human rights law in their de-
cisionmaking. It also highlighted which human rights law is most relevant to 
the IWC and which is likely to be relevant to other resource-related interna-
tional bodies, such as CITES. 
The workshop, however, is but a first step towards integrating human 
rights into international organizations because several key issues went un-
addressed. First, none of the workshop participants described the content of 
these rights. For example, what exactly does the right to self-determination 
allow indigenous peoples to do? What is the scope of the right to lands, territo-
ries, and resources? Second, they did not describe the limitations of the rights. 
As the following section makes clear, the Human Rights Committee and the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights have noted that these rights are not 
absolute and that rights can be affected without being abrogated. These issues 
are discussed in this Section. Third, the workshop participants did not describe 
whether international organizations have the duty to implement these rights. As 
described in Section IV, a strong case can be made that international organiza-
tions like the IWC have an obligation—either directly as an international or-
ganization or indirectly through the actions of the individual IWC members—
to implement human rights and other legal norms that have attained the status 
of customary international law. 
A. Background on Customary International Law 
Customary international law, along with treaties and general principles of 
law, constitute the three sources of international law.54 Customary international 
law is significant because, unlike treaties, it binds all nations, not just those 
                                                                                                                           
 52 Stamatopoulou, supra note 14, at 9. 
 53 Int’l Whaling Comm’n, Report of the IWC Expert Workshop on ASW, supra note 6, § 3.1. 
 54 See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 
(entered into force Oct. 24, 1945). 
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that have consented to it, “not because it was prescribed by any superior pow-
er, but because it has been generally accepted as a rule of conduct.”55 Custom-
ary international law has always proved challenging because it is difficult to 
identify in practice. The standard formula for identifying a norm of customary 
international law is to determine whether sufficient state practice implementing 
the norm exists and whether states conduct themselves consistently with state 
practice out of a sense of legal obligation, a concept called opinio juris.56 Suf-
ficient state practice is defined in terms of consistent, not necessarily universal, 
practice among states.57 Opinio juris can be found from a State’s acceptance of 
the norm in treaties, declarations, resolutions, and perhaps even from state 
practice itself.58 
In the case of human rights, the relevant sources of law are numerous. 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),59 the Inter-
national Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),60 ILO 
Convention 169,61 and the American Convention on Human Rights (American 
Convention)62 provide important treaty sources of human rights law. In addi-
tion, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights63 and UNDRIP provide im-
portant non-treaty evidence of human rights norms. UNDRIP, for example, 
represents a massive, global effort to identify the rights of indigenous people.64 
                                                                                                                           
 55 See The Scotia, 81 U.S. 170, 187–88 (1871); Asylum (Colom./Peru), Judgment, 1950 I.C.J. 
266, 276 (Nov. 20) (stating that “[t]he Party which relies on a custom of this kind must prove that this 
custom is established in such a manner that it has become binding on the other Party”). 
 56 For a discussion of the challenges of identifying custom, see Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Tradi-
tional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 
757 (2001). 
 57 See, e.g., Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. 3, 23–26 (July 25) (stating 
that the twelve-mile limit for a territorial sea “appears now to be generally accepted” and that there is 
“an increasing and widespread acceptance of the concept of preferential rights for coastal States . . . in 
a situation of special dependence on coastal fisheries”);  Asylum, 1950 I.C.J. at 276 (stating that a rule 
invoked as custom must have “a constant and uniform usage practised by the States in question”). 
 58 See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar./U.S.), 1986 
I.C.J. 14 (June 27); North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den.; Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3 
(Feb. 20). 
 59 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 60 See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 
999 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
 61 See ILO Convention 169, supra note 42. 
 62 See American Convention on Human Rights: “Pact of San José, Costa Rica,” Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 
U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force July 18, 1978), https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume
%201144/volume-1144-I-17955-English.pdf [https://perma.cc/54L9-TU2Z] [hereinafter American Con-
vention]. 
 63 See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 64 UNDRIP was adopted by 143 states, with just four states voting against it and eleven abstain-
ing. S. James Anaya & Siegfried Wiessner, The U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peo-
ples: Towards Re-empowerment, JURIST (Oct. 3, 2007, 8:01 AM), http://www.jurist.org/forum/2007/
10/un-declaration-on-rights-of-indigenous.php [https://perma.cc/QQ8K-XGKR]. Australia, Canada, 
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As United Nations General Assembly resolutions, UNDRIP and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights are not legally binding, but this does not mean 
that some of their provisions do not reflect customary international law. In fact, 
some provisions of UNDRIP undeniably articulate customary international 
law,65 although scholars disagree about the extent to which UNDRIP in its en-
tirety can be considered representative of customary international law.66 As 
explained below, the rights to self-determination, lands, territories and re-
sources, and cultural identity are customary international law. What is less 
clear is the content of these rights. 
B. The Right to Self-Determination 
UNDRIP states that indigenous peoples have the right to self-determin-
ation; that is, they have the right to “freely determine their political status and 
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”67 Even the 
four States that rejected UNDRIP—the United States, Canada, Australia, and 
New Zealand—have demonstrated varying levels of recognition of the right to 
self-determination for indigenous people68 and have subsequently endorsed 
it.69 
Although UNDRIP is not legally binding, the general right to self-
determination (that is, the right not specific to indigenous peoples) does exist 
in other legally binding treaties. For example, the ICCPR and the ICESCR 
both begin by declaring that “[a]ll peoples have the right to self-
                                                                                                                           
New Zealand and the United States voted against adoption of UNDRIP while Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, 
Bhutan, Burundi, Colombia, Georgia, Kenya, Nigeria, the Russian Federation, Samoa and Ukraine 
abstained. Id.; Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS.: OFF. 
HIGH COMMISSIONER, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/IPeoples/Pages/Declaration.aspx [https://
perma.cc/W6GS-7HP2]. All four States that voted against UNDRIP later supported it. See, e.g., Press 
Release, Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Dep’t of State, Announcement of U.S. Support for the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Dec. 16, 2010), https://2009-2017.state.
gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/12/153027.htm [https://perma.cc/SQ5M-8N4U]. 
 65 See Int’l Law Ass’n, Sofia Conference, Rights of Indigenous People: Final Report, 28–29 
(2012), http://www.ila-hq.org/download.cfm/docid/227B560E-F0F5-4773-BECC974CFC6A11B8 
[https://perma.cc/CT4P-LTSG]. 
 66 See Karen Engle, On Fragile Architecture: The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples in the Context of Human Rights, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 141, 163 (2011) (stating that “while 
some argue that the declaration goes beyond other international legal instruments in terms of recogniz-
ing indigenous rights, others insist that the declaration adds no new rights but rather is simply a state-
ment of what already exists in customary international law”) (footnote omitted). 
 67 UNDRIP, supra note 43, art. 3. 
 68 See Anaya & Wiessner, supra note 64. For example, the U.S. government has recognized Indi-
an tribes as political entities with powers of self-government over a “broad range of internal and local 
affairs.” Id. 
 69 Sven Pfeiffer, Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the International Drug Control Regime: The 
Case of Traditional Coca Leaf Chewing, 5 GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 287, 293 (2013). 
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determination.”70 The right to self-determination is even a foundational princi-
ple of the United Nations (U.N.), with Article 1 of the U.N. Charter stating that 
one purpose of the United Nations is to “develop friendly relations among na-
tions based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination 
of peoples.”71 These treaties and others like them, reflect that self-determin-
ation is widely recognized as customary international law.72 
However, the legal status of the right to self-determination as it applies to 
indigenous peoples is not clear. One author writes that indigenous self-
determination “is or will become customary international law, even though a 
few states may continue to oppose it.”73 The International Law Association’s 
Committee on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples is silent on the question of 
whether self-determination for indigenous peoples has become customary in-
ternational law, while proclaiming other rights to be customary international 
law.74 Others strongly imply that the right to self-determination for indigenous 
peoples has become customary international law.75 
In addition, the actual substantive content of that right is debatable, espe-
cially in the context of indigenous peoples.76 As renowned international schol-
                                                                                                                           
 70 ICCPR, supra note 59, art. 1(1); ICESCR, supra note 60, art. 1(1). 
 71 U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 2. 
 72 See S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 75 n.28 (2nd ed. 2004). 
Self-determination is sometimes called a jus cogens norm as well. Isabelle Schulte-Tenckhoff, Trea-
ties, Peoplehood, and Self-determination: Understanding the Language of Indigenous Rights, in IN-
DIGENOUS RIGHTS IN THE AGE OF THE UN DECLARATION 64, 77 (Elvira Pulitano ed., 2012). 
 73 Robert T. Coulter, The Law of Self-Determination and the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 15 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 1, 27 (2010); see also S. James 
Anaya, International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples: The Move Toward the Multicultural 
State, 21 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 13, 47 (2004) (stating that “[i]t is . . . evident that certain mini-
mum standards concerning indigenous land rights, rooted in accepted precepts of cultural integrity, 
property, nondiscrimination, and self-determination, have made their way not just into conventional 
law but also into general or customary international law”) [hereinafter Anaya, The Move Toward the 
Multicultural State]. 
 74 See Int’l Law Ass’n, The Hague Conference, Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Interim Report, 9–
12 (2010), http://www.ila-hq.org/download.cfm/docid/9E2AEDE9-BB41-42BA-9999F0359E79F62D 
[https://perma.cc/RVR3-2ELM]. The International Law Association states that the Interim Report 
“should be considered an integral part” of the 2012 Final Report “as well as an essential element of 
the overall work of the Committee.” Int’l Law Ass’n, Sofia Conference, supra note 65, at 2. The final 
report was also silent on the question of whether self-determination for indigenous peoples had be-
come customary international law. Int’l Law Ass’n, Sofia Conference, supra note 65, at 3–7. On the 
other hand, it affirmatively stated that “a specific rule of customary international law has developed 
recognizing the right of indigenous peoples to recognition and preservation of their cultural identity.” 
Int’l Law Ass’n, Sofia Conference, supra note 65, at 17. 
 75 See Siegfried Wiessner, The Cultural Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Achievements and Contin-
uing Challenges, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121, 137–38 (2011). 
 76 See, e.g., Matthew Saul, The Normative Status of Self-Determination in International Law: A 
Formula for Uncertainty in the Scope and Content of the Right?, 11 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 609, 610 
(2011) (stating that the right of self-determination “remains one of the most unsettled norms in inter-
national law” with its application beyond the colonial context “‘plagued by an excess of indetermina-
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ar James Crawford has written, “as almost all would agree, self-determination 
is . . . lex obscura. No one is very clear what it means, at least outside the co-
lonial context.”77 Thus, even if self-determination for indigenous peoples has 
become customary international law, identifying which aspects of the right to 
self-determination are customary international law is not self-evident. 
The lack of clarity over the right begins with its scope. Scholars and 
courts often divide the right to self-determination into two distinct types—
external and internal. Internal self-determination refers to how people exercise 
the right to self-determination within the context of an existing state through 
such means as participating in the political process.78 External self-
determination operates outside the bounds of an existing state; it relates to the 
construction of a new, independent state. The Supreme Court of Canada, when 
assessing the legality of Quebec seceding from Canada under international law 
and Canadian law, defined external self-determination as the “‘establishment 
of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with 
an independent State or the emergence into any other political status freely 
determined by a people.’”79 
A right to external self-determination, in the sense of a class of people be-
ing able to establish their own state from within an existing state, exists for a 
few classes of peoples. The Canadian Supreme Court, for example, stated that 
the right to external self-determination exists, at best, for only the first two of 
the following three internationally recognized classes of peoples: 1) those in 
the situation of former colonies or under colonial rule; 2) those under foreign 
military occupation; and 3) those that, as a defined group, are “denied mean-
ingful access to government to pursue their political, economic, social and cul-
tural development.”80 The essence of this third class of people is that it is 
“blocked from the meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination inter-
nally.”81 According to the court, only the first two classes—those under coloni-
al rule and those under foreign occupation or subjugation—undeniably have 
the right to external self-determination.82 It further stated that under “an estab-
                                                                                                                           
cy both in terms of scope and content’”) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Catriona Drew, The East Timor 
Story: International Law on Trial, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 651, 658 (2001)). 
 77 James Crawford, The Right of Self-Determination in International Law: Its Development and 
Future, in PEOPLE’S RIGHTS 7, 10 (Philip Alston ed., 2001). He also states that self-determination “is 
an intensely contested concept in relation to virtually every case where it is invoked.” Id. at 38. 
 78 ANAYA, supra note 72, at 105–06. 
 79 Reference Re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, ¶ 126 (Can.) [hereinafter Secession of 
Quebec]. 
 80 See id. ¶ 138. 
 81 Id. ¶ 134. 
 82 See id. ¶¶ 132–133. 
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lished international law standard” it is “unclear” whether the third class of 
people actually possesses the right to external self-determination.83 
With respect to indigenous peoples, the general consensus in international 
law is that the right to self-determination “operates within the overriding pro-
tection granted to the territorial integrity of ‘parent’ states.”84 In fact, many 
States issued official declarations during the UNDRIP voting process echoing 
this sentiment.85 The Philippines, for example, expressed its understanding that 
“the right to self-determination as expressed in article 3 . . . shall not be con-
strued as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or 
impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of a sovereign 
or independent State.”86 Argentina said that it specifically voted in favor of 
UNDRIP because of the addition of Article 46(1),87 which specifies that 
“[n]othing in this Declaration may be interpreted as . . . authorizing or encour-
aging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the terri-
torial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States.”88 Thus, 
the right to external self-determination in the sense of creating an independent 
state exists only under customary international law for peoples under colonial 
rule or foreign occupation.89 
This conclusion does not deny that indigenous peoples have a right to 
self-determination. As James Anaya has written, “[i]t is a rare case in the post-
colonial world in which self-determination, understood from a human rights 
perspective, will require secession or the dismemberment of states.”90 
In any event, indigenous peoples have the right to engage in some nation-
like activities as a group.91 For example, Article 36(1) of UNDRIP states that 
                                                                                                                           
 83 Id. ¶ 135. 
 84 Id. ¶ 131. James Anaya has written that the right to self-determination “does not mean that 
every group that can be identified as a people has a free standing right to form its own state or to dic-
tate any one particular form of political arrangement.” S. James Anaya, The Right of Indigenous Peo-
ples to Self-Determination in the Post-Declaration Era, in MAKING THE DECLARATION WORK 184, 
189 (Claire Charters & Rodolfo Stavenhagen eds., 2009). There may be, of course, indigenous groups 
that fall within the first two classes of peoples identified by the court in Secession of Quebec and that 
have the right to external self-determination. 
 85 See Int’l Law Ass’n, The Hague Conference, supra note 74, at 9. 
 86 Id. 
 87 See U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., 107th plen. mtg. at 19, U.N. Doc. A/61/PV.107 (Sept. 13, 2007). 
 88 UNDRIP, supra note 43, art. 46(1). 
 89 The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has said that the right to self-
determination for ethnic and religious groups does not include external self-determination, suggesting 
that external self-determination has not become customary international law for some groups. See 
Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, annex VIII(B), at 125, U.N. 
Doc. A/51/18, (Sept. 30, 1996). 
 90 S. James Anaya, Why There Should Not Have to Be a Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 58, 60 (S. James Anaya ed., 
2009). 
 91 See Int’l Law Ass’n, The Hague Conference, supra note 74, at 10. 
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“[i]ndigenous peoples . . . have the right to maintain and develop contacts, re-
lations and cooperation, including activities for spiritual, cultural, political, 
economic and social purposes, with their own members as well as other peo-
ples across borders.”92 Other than this, the essence of the right to self-
determination for indigenous people relates to internal self-determination.93 
Other aspects of UNDRIP elaborate on the elements of internal self-
determination; that is, the ways in which indigenous peoples are able to “freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development.”94 For example, Article 19 requires states to “consult 
and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through 
their own representative institutions in order to obtain . . . consent before 
adopting and implementing legislat[ion]” that could affect them.95 This provi-
sion exemplifies internal self-determination because it aims to ensure partici-
pation of indigenous people in the political process by requiring states to seek 
their input and consent on legal measures that may affect them. This right ap-
plies when a national government implements legislation or a measure that 
could “produce a ‘differentiated effect’ to the prejudice of an indigenous com-
munity.”96 
Although Article 19 of UNDRIP requires governments to obtain the “con-
sent” of indigenous people, the requisite state practice does not exist to say that 
under customary international law indigenous peoples have a general right to 
veto by refusing consent.97 In some matters, international courts have required 
states to obtain the free, prior, and informed consent of an indigenous peoples, 
                                                                                                                           
 92 UNDRIP, supra note 43, art. 36(1). 
 93 See Stefania Errico, The Draft UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: An Over-
view, 7 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 741, 748–49 (2007) (“[T]he right of self-determination that indigenous 
peoples may exercise has, essentially, an internal dimension. . . . In other words, the right to self-
determination in this context would imply constitutional formulae of different kinds through which 
States and indigenous peoples are called to accommodate the latter’s aspirations.”) (second emphasis 
omitted); see also Crawford, supra note 77, at 22, 25 (“The key point about self-determination, and 
about all other human rights, is that these rights are primarily asserted against one’s own state. . . . 
[T]he reference to self-determination [in the Draft UNDRIP] is to internal self-determination, and that 
indigenous peoples are to work out their future within the boundaries of the state in which they hap-
pen to be.”). 
 94 UNDRIP, supra note 43, art. 3. James Anaya rejects the dichotomy between external and inter-
nal self-determination. Nonetheless, his general framework for the right to self-determination embod-
ies the participation, consultation, and consent elements of external and international self-determ-
ination. As he says, “self-determination means that peoples are entitled to participate equally in the 
constitution and development of the governing institutional order under which they live and, further, 
to live within a governing order in which they may live and develop freely on a continuous basis.” S. 
James Anaya, The Contours of Self-Determination and Its Implementation: Implications of Develop-
ments Concerning Indigenous Peoples, in JUSTICE PENDING: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND OTHER 
GOOD CAUSES 5, 12 (Gudmundur Alfredsson et al. eds., 2002). 
 95 UNDRIP, supra note 43, art. 19. 
 96 Int’l Law Ass’n, Sofia Conference, supra note 65, at 3. 
 97 For a full discussion on whether and when consultation or consent is required, see id. at 3–7. 
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while other courts have framed a state’s duty as simply to engage in a good 
faith consultation with the indigenous people affected by their actions.98 The 
International Law Association99 concluded in its 2012 report that states “are 
not obliged to obtain the consent of indigenous peoples before engaging in 
whatever kind of activities which may affect them,” but states are required to 
obtain informed consent when the absence of such consent “would translate 
into a violation of the rights of indigenous peoples that States are bound to 
guarantee and respect.”100 The International Law Association says that consent 
is required for relocation of indigenous people from their territories or when 
the state wants to issue permits for the economic exploitation of indigenous 
lands.101 The U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has 
stressed that that free and informed consent of indigenous people is especially 
important when “the preservation of their cultural resources, especially those 
associated with their way of life and cultural expression, are at risk.”102 
Taken together, these aspects of the right to self-determination provide in-
digenous people rights vis-à-vis the states in which they live. As Erica-Irene A. 
Daes, the former Chair of the U.N. Working Group on Indigenous Populations, 
said, the right to self-determination as articulated in Article 3 of UNDRIP should 
be “ordinarily interpreted as the right of these people to negotiate freely their 
political status and representation in the states in which they live.”103 It is the 
state that has the duty “to accommodate the aspirations of indigenous peoples 
through constitutional reforms designed to share power democratically.”104 
                                                                                                                           
 98 See Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172 (Nov. 28, 2007), http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/
articulos/seriec_172_ing.pdf [https://perma.cc/36AV-KXXT]. The Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights concluded in the Saramaka case that “regarding large-scale development or investment pro-
jects that would have a major impact within Saramaka territory, the State has a duty, not only to con-
sult with the Saramakas, but also to obtain their free, prior, and informed consent, according to their 
customs and traditions.” Id. ¶ 134. 
 99 The International Law Association is a highly influential non-governmental organization. See 
About Us, INT’L L. ASS’N, http://www.ila-hq.org/en/about_us/index.cfm [https://perma.cc/5MUN-
HGXX]. It should not be confused with the International Law Commission, which is a United Nations 
sponsored body. See About the Commission, INT’L L. COMMISSION, http://legal.un.org/ilc/work.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/5ESD-UWFT]. 
 100 Int’l Law Ass’n, Sofia Conference, supra note 65, at 7. 
 101 Id. at 6–7. 
 102 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Political Rights, General Comment No. 
21: Right of Everyone to Take Part in Cultural Life (art. 15, para. 1(a), of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), ¶ 55(e), UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/21 (Dec. 21, 2009). 
 103 Erica-Irene A. Daes, An Overview of the History of Indigenous Peoples: Self-Determination 
and the United Nations, 21 CAMBRIDGE REV. INT’L AFF. 7, 23 (2008) (emphasis added). 
 104 Id. at 24. 
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C. The Right to Traditional Lands, Territories, and Resources 
Indigenous people undoubtedly possess the right to their traditional lands, 
territories, and resources as a matter of customary international law. As the 
International Law Association has written, “the fact that indigenous peoples’ 
land rights are protected by customary international law is not reasonably dis-
putable.”105 James Anaya, the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Rights, has 
written that “[i]t is . . . evident that certain minimum standards concerning in-
digenous land rights, rooted in accepted precepts of cultural integrity, property, 
nondiscrimination, and self-determination, have made their way not just into 
conventional law but also into general or customary international law.”106 
Scholars have looked to various treaties, declarations, and decisions of 
human rights courts and commissions to support their claim that the right to 
land, territories, and resources is customary international law. For example, 
UNDRIP states that indigenous people have the right to the lands, territories, 
and resources “which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise 
used or acquired.”107 Under UNDRIP, this right includes the “right to own, use, 
develop and control the lands, territories and resources that they possess.”108 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights stated in Mayagna (Sumo) 
Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua (the Awas Tingni case)109 that “[i]ndig-
enous groups, by the fact of their very existence, have the right to live freely in 
their own territory” and that the right to property in the American Convention 
includes the right to communal lands.110 Similarly, the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights in the Endorois Welfare Council case concluded 
that “indigenous peoples have a recognised claim to ownership to ancestral 
land under international law, even in the absence of official title deeds.”111 
Relevant state practice indicates that some sort of restitution for lands lost is a 
                                                                                                                           
 105 Int’l Law Ass’n, Sofia Conference, supra note 65, at 27; see also S. James Anaya & Robert A. 
Williams, Jr., The Protection of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Over Lands and Natural Resources Un-
der the Inter-American Human Rights System, 14 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 33, 55 (2001) (arguing that the 
right of indigenous peoples to property and other rights are customary international law). 
 106 Anaya, The Move Toward the Multicultural State, supra note 73, at 47; see also Anaya & 
Weissner, supra note 64. 
 107 UNDRIP, supra note 43, art. 26(1). 
 108 Id. art. 26(2). 
 109 See Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 71 (Aug. 31, 2001). 
 110 Id. ¶¶ 149, 151. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights did not base its decision on cus-
tomary international law; that may have been considered beyond its remit. Nonetheless, “such a radi-
cal re-interpretation of the treaty can only be based on a significant shift in the normative expectations 
of the states . . . found in the same material that has been adduced to prove customary international 
law: pertinent state practice and opinio juris.” Weissner, supra note 75, at 137. 
 111 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. ex rel. Endorois Welfare Council  v. Kenya, No. 276/2003, De-
cision, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights [Afr. Comm’n H.P.R.], ¶ 207 (Nov. 25, 
2009), https://www.escr-net.org/sites/default/files/Endorois_Decision.pdf [https://perma.cc/U47K-
QMKU] [hereinafter Endorois Welfare Council]. 
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key component of this right. The African Commission in Endorois Welfare 
Council affirmed that “the members of indigenous peoples who have unwill-
ingly lost possession of their lands . . . are entitled to restitution thereof or to 
obtain other lands of equal extension and quality.”112 
With respect to indigenous peoples, the right to land, territory, and re-
sources is more than just a traditional property right in the sense of having the 
“exclusive absolute right to use, enjoy and dispose of a thing;” instead, it is a 
right possessing a spiritual or cultural purpose.113 In other words, the right’s 
purpose is to maintain the special link between an indigenous people and their 
traditional lands in order to preserve their distinct cultural identity.114 It is also 
closely associated and entwined with their right to self-determination.115 
UNDRIP links them by stating that “[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to 
determine and develop priorities and strategies for the development or use of 
their lands or territories.”116 The Inter-American Court of Human rights ex-
pressly linked the two rights, as well as the right to culture, in the Awas Tingni 
case by emphasizing that: 
[T]he close ties of indigenous people with the land must be recog-
nized and understood as the fundamental basis of their cultures, their 
spiritual life, their integrity, and their economic survival. For indige-
nous communities, [their relationship with] the land [is] not merely 
a matter of possession and production but a material and spiritual el-
ement which they must fully enjoy . . . to preserve their cultural leg-
acy and transmit it to future generations.117 
Because the right to lands and resources is so closely tied to cultural, spiritual, 
and existential purposes, the right to land and resources must be developed on 
a case-by-case basis, depending on what is necessary to maintain the indige-
nous people’s distinct identity and culture.118 Thus, whereas one indigenous 
group may have a right to salmon as a result of its distinct identity and culture, 
another group may have a right to a different resource. 
                                                                                                                           
 112 Id. at ¶ 209. In this case, the Commission did not conclude that the right to land existed as 
customary international law. However, after assessing a variety of sources of national and internation-
al law, it concluded that “[t]he encroachment is not proportionate to any public need and is not in 
accordance with national and international law.” Id. ¶ 238 (emphasis omitted). 
 113 Int’l Law Ass’n, Sofia Conference, supra note 65, at 27. 
 114 Id. 
 115 See Int’l Law Ass’n, The Hague Conference, supra note 74, at 11; ANAYA, supra note 72, at 
141. Anaya writes that “modern notions of cultural integrity, nondiscrimination, and self-determin-
ation join property precepts in the affirmation of sui generis indigenous land and resource rights.” 
ANAYA, supra note 72, at 142. 
 116 UNDRIP, supra note 43, art. 32(1). 
 117 Awas Tingni, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 71, ¶ 149. 
 118 Int’l Law Ass’n, Sofia Conference, supra note 65, at 28. 
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For the same reason, the right to lands, territories, and resources should 
be interpreted broadly and consistent with the particular indigenous peoples’ 
worldview and cultural identity.119 In fact, the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights has used this logic to conclude that “the cultural and economic survival 
of indigenous and tribal peoples, and their members, depend on their access 
and use of the natural resources in their territory,” that this need to access and 
use natural resources is related to their culture, and that Article 21 of the Amer-
ican Convention protects their right to such natural resources.120 Consequently, 
the court concluded: 
[M]embers of tribal and indigenous communities have the right to 
own the natural resources they have traditionally used within their 
territory for the same reasons that they have a right to own the land 
they have traditionally used and occupied for centuries. Without 
them, the very physical and cultural survival of such peoples is at 
stake. Hence the need to protect the lands and resources they have 
traditionally used to prevent their extinction as a people. That is, the 
aim and purpose of the special measures required on behalf of the 
members of indigenous and tribal communities is to guarantee that 
they may continue living their traditional way of life, and that their 
distinct cultural identity, social structure, economic system, customs, 
beliefs and traditions are respected, guaranteed and protected by 
States.121 
At the same time, the exact substance and extent of that right is not cer-
tain.122 For example, the right to lands, territories, and resources traditionally 
possessed and controlled but no longer possessed and controlled is not clear.123 
Similarly, the right to resources on lands never possessed and controlled, par-
                                                                                                                           
 119 Int’l Law Ass’n, The Hague Conference, supra note 74, at 21. 
 120 Saramaka People, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 120. Article 21(1) of the American 
Convention on Human Rights establishes, inter alia, that “[e]veryone has the right to the use and en-
joyment of his property. The law may subordinate such use and enjoyment to the interest of society.” 
American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 62, art. 21(1). 
 121 Saramaka People, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 121 (footnote omitted). Consequent-
ly, the relevant state has the duty to protect indigenous people’s right to use their lands in their tradi-
tional ways (i.e., hunting and fishing), and a prohibition on relocating them without their free, prior, 
and informed consent, as well as appropriate compensation. Lands taken from them without their free, 
prior, and informed consent should be returned, or as briefly discussed above, the state should provide 
some sort of restitution or compensation. Int’l Law Ass’n, Sofia Conference, supra note 65, at 28. 
 122 See Int’l Law Ass’n, The Hague Conference, supra note 74, at 47; Int’l Law Ass’n, Sofia Con-
ference, supra note 65, at 27 (stating that “the fact that indigenous peoples’ land rights are protected 
by customary international law is not reasonably disputable as a matter of positive law”). 
 123 See Int’l Law Ass’n, The Hague Conference, supra note 74, at 21; Errico, supra note 93, at 
754 (“[T]he Declaration does not specify what are exactly the resources which indigenous peoples 
have the right ‘to own, use, develop and control.’ Do they encompass sub-soil resources or are they 
rather to be understood merely as surface resources?”). 
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ticularly in the marine environment, is not clear. In fact, an earlier draft of 
UNDRIP provided that “[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to own, develop, 
control and use the lands and territories, including the total environment of the 
lands, air, waters, coastal seas, sea-ice, flora and fauna and other resources 
which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used.”124 The 
final version omits reference to “the total environment of the lands, air, waters, 
coastal seas, sea-ice, flora and fauna and other resources.” Instead, it pro-
vides, in Article 26(1), that indigenous peoples have the right “to the lands, 
territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or oth-
erwise used or acquired.”125 Moreover, Article 26(2) provides that indigenous 
peoples have the right “to own, use, develop and control the lands, territories 
and resources that they possess by reason of traditional ownership or other tra-
ditional occupation or use, as well as those which they have otherwise ac-
quired.”126 In other words, Article 26(1) provides a right to lands and resources 
currently and historically possessed or used; it does not provide a right to actu-
ally use and develop those resources.127 Article 26(2) provides the right to use 
and develop resources, but only those presently possessed.128  
The available travaux préparatoires does not shed light on the reasons for 
(1) the omission of the italicized draft text above and, thus, whether marine 
resources are included within the right, or (2) the distinction that is made in 
Articles 26(1) and 26(2) and, thus, whether indigenous peoples have rights to 
use resources that they do not possess or have otherwise acquired. The omis-
sion in Article 26(1) of the phrase “the total environment of the lands, air, wa-
ters, coastal seas, sea-ice, flora and fauna and other resources” could indicate 
that negotiators considered reference to specific resources unnecessary because 
the term “resources” encompasses the resources included in the deleted list or, 
in contrast, that they wanted to exclude certain resources.129 
For two reasons, however, it seems more likely that the negotiators want-
ed to exclude certain resources. First, Article 25 refers to the right of indige-
nous peoples “to maintain and strengthen their distinctive spiritual relationship 
                                                                                                                           
 124 Sub-Comm’n on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, Technical Review of the 
United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, art. 26, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
Sub.2/1994/2/Add.1 (Apr. 20, 1994) [hereinafter Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peo-
ples] (emphasis added). 
 125 UNDRIP, supra note 43, art. 26(1). The final text of Article 26(1) provides, in full, that 
“[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditional-
ly owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.” Id. 
 126 Id. art. 26(2). 
 127 See Jérémie Gilbert & Cathal Doyle, A New Dawn over the Land: Shedding Light on Collec-
tive Ownership and Consent, in REFLECTIONS ON THE UN DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGE-
NOUS PEOPLES 289, 298 (Stephen Allen & Alexandra Xanthaki eds., 2011). 
 128 See id. 
 129  Compare UNDRIP, supra note 43, art. 26(1), with Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indige-
nous Peoples, supra note 124, art. 26. 
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with their traditionally owned or otherwise occupied and used lands, territo-
ries, waters and coastal seas and other resources and to uphold their responsi-
bilities to future generations in this regard.”130 It seems unlikely that they 
would retain language referencing coastal resources in one provision while 
expressly excluding a similar phrase elsewhere unless they intended some dis-
tinction. The principle expressio unius est exclusio alterius directs treaty inter-
preters to exclude an item when that item is not expressly included;131 this 
canon of interpretation seems particularly apt when that item is expressly men-
tioned elsewhere.132 
Second, some state negotiators generally worried about potential overly 
broad interpretations of the phrase “other resources, which [indigenous people] 
have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used.” The United States, 
for example, expressed concern that the language was too broad and could be 
construed to give ownership to indigenous people of land currently owned by 
non-indigenous people.133 Similarly, other governments, including Russia and 
Canada, wanted to ensure that Article 26 was interpreted so as not to force the 
eviction of those currently occupying the land.134 While these concerns did not 
speak directly to the issue of marine resources, they show that some state ne-
gotiators sought to narrow the scope of Article 26. 
Nonetheless, Article 26(1) refers to the right to lands, territories, and re-
sources that indigenous peoples have traditionally owned, occupied, or “oth-
erwise used.”135 The phrase “otherwise used,” when used in reference to re-
sources, could apply—and arguably should apply—to coastal resources since 
those resources have been important to a large number of indigenous peoples. 
Moreover, if the use of a marine resource is at the core of a peoples’ culture, 
then the right to that resource could reasonably be within an indigenous peo-
ples’ rights to resources, culture, and self-determination. At the same time, Ar-
ticle 26(1) does not speak to a right to use such resources—only a right to the 
resources. This distinction is significant because Article 26(2) only recognizes 
                                                                                                                           
 130 UNDRIP, supra note 43, art. 25 (emphasis added). 
 131 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 1279–80 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds., 
9th ed. 1992). The phrase expressio unius est exclusio alterius means when one or more things of a 
class are expressly mentioned, others of the same class are excluded. Expressio uniusest exclusion 
alterius, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 132 See UNDRIP, supra note 43, art. 46. 
 133 Comm’n on Human Rights, Report of the Working Group Established in Accordance with 
Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32, ¶ 99, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/84 (Dec. 6, 1999). 
 134 Id. at ¶ 110 (stating that Russia wanted to ensure that “the relevant articles on land should not 
lead to an infringement on the State or an encroachment upon peoples already living on the land”); 
Comm’n on Human Rights, Report of the Working Group  Established in Accordance with Commis-
sion on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32 of 3 March 1995 on its Eleventh Session, at 54, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN E/CN.4/2006/79 (Mar. 22, 2006) (stating that Canada wanted Article 26 to “tak[e] into account 
present and historical circumstances”) (emphasis added). 
 135 See UNDRIP, supra note 43, art. 26(1). 
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a right to the right to own, use, develop, and control lands, territories, and re-
sources that are currently possessed or otherwise acquired.136  
In light of these opposing arguments, and with no clear statement on the 
matter, it is not possible at this time to say with any certainty whether indige-
nous peoples have the right to use resources, including those in the marine en-
vironment, beyond their lands and territories.137 
As with the right to self-determination, the right to lands, territories, and 
resources is not absolute. For example, UNDRIP allows military activities to 
take place on the lands and territories of indigenous peoples provided those 
activities are “justified by a relevant public interest or otherwise freely agreed 
with or requested by the indigenous peoples concerned.”138 The American 
Convention declares that “[n]o one shall be deprived of his property except 
upon payment of just compensation, for reasons of public utility or social in-
terest, and in the cases and according to the forms established by law.”139 In 
addition, indigenous peoples may not have rights to subsurface minerals.140 
After reviewing the drafting history of UNDRIP, one observer has concluded 
that “it is believed that there is indeed very little room left for arguing that the 
Declaration differentiates itself from the general practice denying indigenous 
peoples control over subsoil resources.”141 
The American Convention also limits the right to lands, territories, and 
resources by granting indigenous peoples and others the right to use and enjoy 
property but also stating that the “law may subordinate such use and enjoy-
ment to the interest of society.”142 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
                                                                                                                           
 136 UNDRIP, supra note 43, art. 26(2). 
 137 Presumably one distinction UNDRIP seeks to make is whether lands must be returned to in-
digenous peoples that they do not currently possess or whether restitution is required. See UNDRIP, 
supra note 43, art. 27–28. 
 138 Id. art. 30(1). 
 139 American Convention, supra note 62, art. 21(2). 
 140 In Latin America, the rights to subsurface resources typically belong to the state. See Osvaldo 
Kreimer, Report of the Rapporteur, at 15, Permanent Council of the Org. of Am. States, OEA/
Ser.K/XVI (Feb. 20, 2003), http://www.oas.org/consejo/cajp/docs/cp10830e04.doc [https://perma.
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143; see also Gaetano Pentassuglia, Towards a Jurisprudential Articulation of Indigenous Land 
Rights, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 165, 169 (2011) (stating that under UNDRIP, “the crucial question of natu-
ral (sub-surface) resources has been left essentially unresolved”). Nonetheless, he says, they should be 
granted such rights when those rights are granted to other landowners. See ANAYA, supra note 72, at 
143. 
 141 Stefania Errico, The Controversial Issue of Natural Resources: Balancing States’ Sovereignty 
with Indigenous Peoples’ Rights, in REFLECTIONS ON THE UN DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 329, 340–41 (Stephen Allen & Alexandra Xanthaki eds., 2011). Errico later 
concludes that UNDRIP “encounters a major limitation with regard to subsoil resources, as States 
normally retain ownership of such resources.” Id. at 365. 
 142 American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 62, art. 21(1). 
2017] Indigenous Rights and the IWC’s Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling Regime 87 
has explicitly said that the right to property and resources found in the Ameri-
can Convention “should not be interpreted in a way that prevents the State 
from granting any type of concession for the exploration and extraction of nat-
ural resources within [indigenous or tribal] territory.”143 Thus, the court has 
held that:  
[I]n accordance with Article 21 of the Convention, a State may re-
strict the use and enjoyment of the right to property where the re-
strictions are: a) previously established by law; b) necessary; c) pro-
portional, and d) with the aim of achieving a legitimate objective in 
a democratic society.144 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has explained that the necessity of 
legally established restrictions depends on whether they are designed to satisfy 
“an imperative public interest; it is insufficient to prove, for example, that the 
law fulfills a useful or timely purpose.”145 In addition, proportionality “is based 
on the restriction being closely adjusted to the attainment of a legitimate objec-
tive, interfering as little as possible with the effective exercise of the restricted 
right.”146 Lastly, the restrictions “must be justified by collective objectives that, 
because of their importance, clearly prevail over the necessity of full enjoy-
ment of the restricted right.”147 
Moreover, when a restriction affects indigenous peoples, it must “not de-
ny their survival as a tribal people.”148 The acceptability of such restrictions 
also depends on whether indigenous peoples or other minority groups have had 
a chance to participate in the decision-making process.149 As the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights has explained, “consultations must be in 
good faith, through culturally appropriate procedures and with the objective of 
reaching an agreement.”150 
It is clear the right to lands, territories, and resources is customary inter-
national law and the right is not absolute. Nonetheless, it is not clear precisely 
what the test is for interfering with the right. As described in this Section, the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights has a well-developed jurisprudence in 
                                                                                                                           
 143 Saramaka People, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 126. 
 144 Id. ¶ 127. 
 145 Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶ 145 (June 17, 2005). 
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this area. Because the ICCPR does not have a right to property or a right to 
land, the Human Rights Committee has not developed a test specifically ad-
dressing this issue. Nonetheless, in the context of the right to cultural integrity, 
which the Committee has stated does encompass a right to land for indigenous 
peoples, the Committee has stated that restrictions must be subject to “reason-
able and objective justification.”151 Moreover, there is widespread support for 
requiring the participation of indigenous peoples in decisions that affect their 
right to land, territory, and resources even if the precise terms for participation 
are not universally agreed upon.152 
D. The Right to Cultural Integrity 
The right to cultural integrity has achieved international customary law 
status.153 The right to cultural integrity is found in many important internation-
al documents, including Article 27 of the ICCPR.154 ILO Convention 169 and 
UNDRIP also include provisions relating to cultural integrity and the protec-
tion of indigenous culture more generally.155 Principle 22 of the Rio Declara-
tion,156 Article 8(j) of the Convention on Biological Diversity,157 and Articles 
18(l) and 16(g) of the Desertification Convention158 all refer to the idea of cul-
tural integrity.159 
1. The Scope of the Right to Cultural Integrity 
Human rights commissions and courts have concluded that the right to 
cultural integrity is not only customary international law but an essential aspect 
of protecting indigenous rights. For example, the Inter-American Commission 
                                                                                                                           
 151 Lovelace v. Canada, Human Rights Committee, Comm. No. R.6/24, ¶¶ 16–17, U.N. Doc. 
A/36/40 (1981). 
 152 For a discussion of effective participation, see Pentassuglia, supra note 140, at 169, 176, 178, 
and Errico, supra note 141, at 357–63 (discussing different perspectives on whether a state must ob-
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 153 See ANAYA, supra note 72, at 98. 
 154 See ICCPR, supra note 59, art. 27. 
 155 See ILO Convention 169, supra note 42, art. 23; UNDRIP, supra note 43, art. 11; see also 
Anaya, The Move Toward the Multicultural State, supra note 73, at 23 (discussing the rights the ILO 
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 157 See Convention on Biological Diversity art. 8(j), June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S 79 (entered into 
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 158 See United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in Those Countries Experiencing 
Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa, adopted June 17, 1994, 1954 U.N.T.S. 
3 (entered into force Dec. 26, 1996). 
 159 See generally Cherie Metcalf, Indigenous Rights and the Environment: Evolving International 
Law, 35 OTTAWA L. REV. 101, 107–11 (2003) (discussing how each of these international conven-
tions and declarations imply the international customary law of cultural integrity). 
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on Human Rights (Commission) held in Coulter v. Brazil (the Yanomami case) 
that Brazil violated Article 27 of the ICCPR, which grants “special protection 
on [indigenous people’s] use of their own language, for the practice of their 
own religion, and, in general, for all those characteristics necessary for the 
preservation of their cultural identity,” even though Brazil was not a signatory 
at the time of the decision.160 In reviewing the facts, the Commission found 
that after Brazil approved a highway through Yanomami territory, geologists, 
mining prospectors, and farm workers settled in Yanomami territory, resulting 
in the Yanomami losing lands; they also introduced measles, tuberculosis, and 
influenza, among other threats to the Yanomami.161 In addition, many 
Yanomami who lived near the highway abandoned their villages and became 
beggars or prostitutes.162 While taking into account ICCPR Article 27, the 
Commission concluded that Brazil violated a number of rights included in the 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man163 closely associated 
with the right to cultural integrity: the right to life, liberty, and personal securi-
ty; the right to residence and movement; and the right to the preservation of 
health and well-being.164 
Other cases show how the right to cultural integrity relates to the right to 
lands and resources. For example, in Ominayak v. Canada, the Human Rights 
Committee interpreted ICCPR Article 27 as applicable to those “economic and 
social activities” relied on by the Lubicon Lake Band of Cree Indians as a 
group.165 Chief Ominayak of the Lubicon Lake Band claimed that Canada vio-
lated ICCPR Article 27 by leasing virtually all of the traditional Lubicon land 
for oil and gas exploration, a pulp mill, and associated timber harvesting, thus 
precluding fishing and hunting that the Lubicon people relied on for their live-
lihood.166 In an opaque conclusion, the Committee stated that “[h]istorical in-
equities . . . and certain more recent developments threaten the way of life and 
culture of the Lubicon Lake Band, and constitute a violation of article 27 so 
long as they continue.”167 The Committee never stated, however, what consti-
tuted “historical inequities.” Whether these inequities related to the failure to 
designate a reserve for the Lubicon Lake Band, the allowance of oil and gas 
                                                                                                                           
 160 Coulter v. Brazil (Yanomami Case), No. 7615, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Resolution. No. 
12/85, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.66, doc. 10 rev. 1, “Considering,” ¶ 7 (1985). 
 161 Id. ¶¶ 10(a)–(b). 
 162 Id. ¶ 10(c). 
 163 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, OEA/Ser.L./V.II.22, doc. 21, rev. 6 
(1948), reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, 
OEA/Ser.L.V./II.82, doc. 6, rev. 1, at 17. 
 164 See Yanomami Case, No. 7615, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. ¶¶ 1, 7. 
 165 Ominayak v. Canada, Human Rights Committee, Comm. No. 167/1984, ¶ 32.2, U.N. Doc. No. 
CCPR/C/38/D/167/1984 (1990). 
 166 Id. ¶ 27.4. 
 167 Id. ¶ 33. 
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exploration, or the operation of the pulp mill with its associated timber harvest-
ing is simply left unsaid.168 Nonetheless, the Committee tied these inequities 
and developments to threats to the band’s way of life, which included fishing 
and hunting. 
The Human Rights Committee subsequently interpreted “culture” in the 
context of ICCPR Article 27 consistently with its view of the Ominayak case, 
that culture and land are entwined: 
[C]ulture manifests itself in many forms, including a particular way 
of life associated with the use of land resources, [e]specially in the 
case of indigenous peoples. That right may include such traditional 
activities as fishing or hunting and the right to live in reserves pro-
tected by law. The enjoyment of those rights may require positive 
legal measures of protection and measures to ensure the effective 
participation of members of minority communities in decisions 
which affect them.169 
In Länsman v. Finland, the Human Rights Committee applied the right to 
cultural integrity and balanced the Sami’s traditional and modernized access to 
resources with Finland’s right to economic growth.170 Finland allowed quarry-
ing of stone and transportation of that stone through reindeer herding territo-
ry.171 In keeping with the broad interpretation of “culture” articulated above, 
the Human Rights Committee concluded that Article 27 “does not only protect 
traditional means of livelihood of national minorities;” it also covers tradition-
al activities modified with modern technology.172 
2. Limits to the Right to Cultural Integrity 
As with the right to self-determination and the right to lands, territories, 
and resources, the right to culture is not absolute. In Lovelace v. Canada, the 
Committee concluded that Canada’s rationale for excluding an individual from 
                                                                                                                           
 168 See Dominic McGoldrick, Canadian Indians, Cultural Rights, and the Human Rights Commit-
tee, 40 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 658, 666 (1991) (stating that “[p]resumably the inequity lay in” not grant-
ing the band a reservation consistent with Canadian law, and that “‘more recent developments’” likely 
referred to the issuance of leases for oil and gas exploration but that it is unclear whether it relates to 
the pulp mill and timber harvesting). 
 169 Human Rights Comm., General Comment Adopted by the Human Rights Committee Under 
Article 40, Paragraph 4, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5 (1994) (footnote omitted). Paragraph 7, from which this quotation derives, 
specifically references Ominayak in a footnote. See id. ¶ 7 n.5. 
 170 Länsman v. Finland, Human Rights Committee, Comm. No. 511/1992, U.N. Doc. CCPR/
C/52/D/511/1992 (Nov. 8, 1994). 
 171 See id. ¶ 3.1. 
 172 Id. ¶ 9.3. 
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her indigenous group violated ICCPR Article 27.173 Sandra Lovelace married a 
non-Indian and lost her status as a member of the Tobique band; consequently, 
the Indian Act of Canada prevented her from living on the Tobique Reserve.174 
The Human Rights Committee found that Lovelace’s right to access her native 
culture and language “in community with the other members” of her group had 
been interfered with because the community of Indians belonging to the To-
bique Reserve did not exist elsewhere.175 Nonetheless, the Committee declared 
that “not every interference can be regarded as a denial of rights within the 
meaning of article 27.”176 Restrictions based on “reasonable and objective jus-
tification” may be consistent with Article 27’s right to cultural integrity.177 The 
Committee concluded that the Indian Act, which prevented Lovelace from be-
longing to and residing with the band, was not reasonable or necessary to pre-
serve the identity of the tribe as a whole; it was “an unjustifiable denial of her 
rights.”178 Thus, Canada violated Article 27.179 
The Human Rights Committee came to a similar conclusion in Länsman. 
In Länsman, the Committee stated that an activity or measure that denies a mi-
nority group its right to culture violates the right; however, “measures that 
have a certain limited impact on the way of life of persons belonging to a mi-
nority will not necessarily amount to a denial of the right under article 27.”180 
The Committee agreed that the Sami represented a minority group within the 
scope of Article 27 and that reindeer husbandry constituted an essential ele-
ment of Sami culture.181 The Committee then asked whether the impact of the 
quarry was “so substantial” that it effectively denied the Sami the right to their 
culture182 and concluded that the quarrying that had taken place did not deny 
the Sami their rights.183 The Committee noted that the quarrying “does not ap-
pear to have . . . adversely affected” reindeer herding.184 The Committee also 
noted that the Sami reindeer husbandry association had been consulted and 
helped frame restrictions on the quarrying activities.185 
                                                                                                                           
 173 See Lovelace v. Canada, Comm. No. R.6/24, ¶¶ 16–17. 
 174 Id. ¶¶ 9.6, 15. 
 175 Id. ¶ 15 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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 181 Id. ¶ 9.2. 
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 183 Id. ¶ 9.6. 
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The Committee came to its conclusion by balancing the “essential” nature 
of the cultural activity against the impacts of the state’s economic activity.186 
The Committee did not explain how important the state’s interest needed to be, 
but rather focused on the economic activity’s impact on the cultural activity.187 
However, the Committee did caution that future quarrying or other “economic 
activities must . . . be carried out in a way that the [Sami people] continue to 
benefit from reindeer husbandry” and a larger scale operation could violate 
Article 27.188 Länsman illustrates that the principle of cultural integrity is not 
absolute and can be balanced with the interests of society and the state.189 A 
state may interfere with the exercise of the right up to a certain point as long as 
it is justified in doing so. 
The Committee in Kitok v. Sweden was also asked to investigate the im-
pact of restrictions on the right to culture.190 In this case, Kitok claimed he was 
denied membership to the Sami village and re-entry into reindeer husbandry, 
and therefore denied the right to enjoy his culture in Sweden because Swedish 
legislation subjected re-entry into reindeer husbandry to a vote by the vil-
lage.191 The Human Rights Committee concluded that Kitok’s right to enjoy 
his culture was not violated because the legislation was designed to protect and 
sustain the Sami’s cultural practice of reindeer herding as a whole by limiting 
the number of individuals engaged in the practice.192 The Committee, relying 
on Lovelace, stated that “a restriction upon the right of an individual member 
of a minority must be shown to have a reasonable and objective justification 
and to be necessary for the continued viability and welfare of the minority as a 
whole.”193 Because the legislation limiting the number of reindeer herders was 
necessary “to ensure the future of reindeer breeding and the livelihood of those 
for whom reindeer farming is the primary source of income,”194 and because 
                                                                                                                           
 186 See id. at ¶¶ 9.4–.6. The Committee stated that “[a] state may understandably wish to encour-
age development or allow economic activity by enterprises. The scope of its freedom to do so is not to 
be assessed by reference to a margin of appreciation, but by reference to the obligations it has under-
taken in article 27.” Id. ¶ 9.4. 
 187 See id. ¶ 9.4 (stating that “measures that have a certain limited impact on the way of life of 
persons belonging to a minority will not necessarily amount to a denial of the right under article 27”). 
 188 Id. ¶ 9.8. 
 189 See Anaya, The Move Toward the Multicultural State, supra note 73, at 30 (stating that the 
Human Rights Committee in Länsman “instructed that rights of cultural integrity are not absolute 
when confronted with the interests of society as a whole”). 
 190 Kitok v. Sweden, Human Rights Committee, Comm. No. 197/1985, ¶ 4.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/
C/33/D/197/1985 (July 27, 1988). 
 191 Id. ¶¶ 2.1–.2, 4.1. 
 192 Id. ¶ 4.2. 
 193 Id. ¶ 9.8 (emphasis added). 
 194 Id. ¶ 9.5. The Committee stated in full: 
According to the State party, the purposes of the Reindeer Husbandry Act are to restrict 
the number of reindeer breeders for economic and ecological reasons and to secure the 
preservation and well-being of the Sami minority. Both parties agree that effective 
2017] Indigenous Rights and the IWC’s Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling Regime 93 
Kitok could graze his reindeer, although not as of right, the Committee found 
no violation of ICCPR Article 27.195 
As with the right to self-determination and the right to lands, territories, 
and resources, participation and consultation in the decision-making process is 
an important element for determining whether a state is upholding the right to 
culture. In Mahuika v. New Zealand,196 New Zealand enacted the Treaty of 
Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act that limited the rights of the Maori 
tribe “to enjoy their own culture.”197 The act affected the various ways the 
Maori could engage in commercial and non-commercial fishing, a fundamental 
feature of Maori culture and religion.198 The Human Rights Committee ruled 
that although the act affected the rights of the Maori tribe, New Zealand’s ac-
tions were compatible with ICCPR Article 27 because New Zealand engaged 
in a consultation process that included the Maori and paid special attention to 
their cultural and religious relationship to fishing.199 This case illustrates that 
when indigenous people are included in the consultation and legislation pro-
cess, a state can avoid violating Article 27 despite limiting the indigenous 
group’s rights.200 
The cases above demonstrate that the Human Rights Committee and 
courts use some sort of balancing test or impact analysis to decide whether the 
right to cultural integrity has been upheld. Although they do not explicitly state 
that they are employing a balancing test or impact analysis, each case refer-
                                                                                                                           
measures are required to ensure the future of reindeer breeding and the livelihood of 
those for whom reindeer farming is the primary source of income. The method selected 
by the State party to secure these objectives is the limitation of the right to engage in 
reindeer breeding to members of the Sami villages. The Committee is of the opinion 
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tion of Article 27. Id. ¶¶ 9.6–.8. 
 195 Id. ¶ 9.8. 
 196 Mahuika v. New Zealand, Human Rights Committee, Comm. No. 547/1993, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/70/D/547/1993 (Nov. 16, 2000). 
 197 Id. ¶¶ 6.1, 9.5. 
 198 Id. ¶¶ 8.2, 9.4. 
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 200 See id. Although here some of the Maori did participate in the settlement and consultation 
process, the Committee concluded that because the state simply engaged 
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cific attention to the sustainability of Maori fishing activities, [the state had] taken the 
necessary steps to ensure that the Fisheries Settlement and its enactment through legis-
lation, including the Quota Management System, [were] compatible with article 27. 
Id. This engagement in the consultation process was enough to ensure compliance with Article 27 
ICCPR. Id. 
94 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 40:63 
ences the essential nature of the indigenous peoples’ interest, the state’s legisla-
tive purpose, and the extent of the adverse impact on the rights of indigenous 
peoples. When an individual’s essential cultural interest is at stake, the test as-
sesses whether the restrictions on that person’s right “have a reasonable and 
objective justification and [are] necessary for the continued viability and wel-
fare of the minority as a whole.”201 However, the test varies when the entire 
group’s interests are at stake. When a state consults with indigenous people 
and pays close attention to an indigenous group’s activities, the balance may 
tip in favor of the state.202 The state’s actions perhaps look more reasonable if 
undertaken with the participation of the affected indigenous community. Also, 
when the state presents a reasonable and objective justification to limit indige-
nous access to resources, the state’s actions do not violate the right to cultural 
integrity under ICCPR Article 27.203 For example, when the state has an inter-
est in economic development and the restriction on the indigenous group’s ac-
cess to resources is minimal, the state does not violate Article 27.204 However, 
if the economic development continues and escalates, the restriction might vio-
late ICCPR Article 27.205 
III. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS BY  
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
As described in the previous Section, the rights to lands, territories, and 
resources, and to cultural identity are all customary international law, and the 
right to self-determination as it relates to indigenous peoples may already be 
customary international law. Yet, questions remain as to whether these rights 
must be embodied in the rules of international organizations such as the IWC. 
As noted, the right to lands, territories, and resources does not clearly apply to 
the marine environment and to marine resources. Even assuming it does, a 
separate question is whether an international organization such as the IWC has 
a responsibility to implement these rights. 
The law on this subject is far from clear. The first issue is whether an in-
ternational organization such as the IWC has a direct responsibility to imple-
ment human rights and other relevant international law because it has interna-
tional legal personality, or whether it has an indirect responsibility to do so 
because the state parties in their individual capacities have the duty to act con-
                                                                                                                           
 201 Kitok v. Sweden, Comm. No. 197/1985, ¶ 9.8; see also Lovelace v. Canada, Comm. No. R.6/
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sistently with human rights and other international law when participating in 
an international organization. For the purpose of establishing whether a duty to 
implement these human rights exists, the distinction between a direct and indi-
rect duty is irrelevant. If the international organization has a direct duty, then 
states acting collectively must ensure the behavior of the international organi-
zation conforms to relevant international law. If the duty is indirect, then the 
individual states must ensure that their decisions and actions taken within an 
international organization conform to relevant law. In either case, a state must 
ensure it acts consistently with international law. Whether the duty falls on the 
international organization directly or indirectly is relevant only to the extent 
that a remedy is sought for noncompliance; if the duty belongs to the state, 
then another state may challenge noncompliance at the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) or in other fora.206 If the duty belongs directly to the IWC as an 
international organization, then a remedy may not exist since the IWC and oth-
er international organizations are not subject to the jurisdiction of the ICJ and 
other international adjudicatory or compliance fora. 
The second issue relates to which international law an international or-
ganization must implement. Scholars have used several different theories to 
claim that treaty law and customary international law may or may not apply 
directly or indirectly to international organizations. Scholars and the Interna-
tional Law Commission mostly agree, with some exceptions, that treaty law 
does not apply directly or indirectly to international organizations.207 On the 
question of whether customary international law and general principles of law 
bind international organizations, answers vary from “yes, maybe, sometimes, 
and always.”208 
As to the first issue, this Section concludes that an international organiza-
tion, either directly or indirectly, has a duty to implement customary interna-
tional law. As to the second issue, this Section concludes that international or-
ganizations must always implement jus cogens norms as these obligations are 
nonderogable. They must also implement relevant customary international law; 
however, states may opt out of non-jus cogens norms when establishing the 
international organization or through the decision-making processes of an in-
ternational organization. 
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A. The Applicability of Customary International Law to  
International Organizations Such as the IWC 
Most international scholars as well as important international law com-
missions believe that customary international law is binding on international 
organizations like the IWC.209 One international law treatise posits that “inter-
national custom will apply as much to international organizations as it does to 
states.”210 The idea appears to have taken root in dicta of the ICJ. In an Adviso-
ry Opinion, the ICJ said that “[i]nternational organizations are subjects of in-
ternational law and, as such, are bound by any obligations incumbent upon 
them under general rules of international law, under their constitutions or under 
international agreement to which they are parties.”211 
Yet, the ICJ did not explain the legal basis for this statement, define “gen-
eral rules of international law,” or describe when such rules are “incumbent” 
upon international organizations.212 As one scholar noted, the ICJ’s “one sen-
tence hardly settles the matter. Not only is the ICJ’s opinion devoid of reason-
ing and unsupported by state practice, but the ICJ’s precise legal conclusion is 
unclear.”213 Consequently, “significant disagreement and uncertainty persists 
about which international law rules bind [international organizations] and 
which they are legally free to ignore.”214 
Nonetheless, two legal theories explain how, at least with respect to cus-
tomary international law, international organizations are bound, directly or indi-
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rectly, by international law. First, Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties provides that treaties should be interpreted in light of “[a]ny 
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the par-
ties.”215 As noted by Sir Ian Sinclair, a negotiator of the Vienna Convention, “[i]t 
would seem logical to take into account, in interpreting a treaty, the state of in-
ternational law at the time of its conclusion.”216 The ICJ has supported this view, 
noting that the court’s interpretation of a treaty “cannot remain unaffected by 
subsequent development of law, through the Charter of the United Nations and 
by way of customary law.”217 Consequently, if a treaty must be interpreted in 
light of subsequent customary international law, then a treaty like the ICRW 
would need to be interpreted in light of that law. Individual countries, either act-
ing as a member of an international organization or in their individual capacities, 
must interpret their treaty obligations consistently with these norms. 
Second, scholars have more or less agreed that states should not be al-
lowed to undertake actions through international organizations that they are not 
allowed to take within their own territories.218 This basic premise has wide-
spread support. As the International Law Commission has said, “[t]he essential 
principle is that a State should not be able to do through another what it could 
not do itself.”219 
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Because of these two legal theories, this report does not need to determine 
whether customary international law binds international organizations directly 
or indirectly. Both theories support the view that customary international law 
binds the actions of states participating in an international organization. 
B. The Customary International Law that Binds  
International Organizations 
Two general forms of customary international law exist: jus cogens and 
non-jus cogens customary international law. Jus cogens customary internation-
al law binds international organizations (directly or indirectly) all the time be-
cause jus cogens norms are nonderogable. As the International Law Commis-
sion has said, jus cogens norms, also known as peremptory norms, must bind 
international organizations because “it can hardly be maintained that States can 
avoid compliance with peremptory norms by creating an organization.”220 In 
fact, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties declares that “[a] treaty is 
void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of 
general international law.”221 It also states that “[i]f a new peremptory norm of 
general international law emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict with 
that norm becomes void and terminates.”222 In light of these provisions, the 
International Law Commission has stated that “[i]f United Nations Member 
States are unable to draw up valid agreements in dissonance with jus cogens, 
they must also be unable to vest an international organization with the power 
to go against peremptory norms.”223 
Non-jus cogens customary international law, however, may or may not 
bind international organizations. The default rule is that these norms bind in-
ternational organizations.224 However, states are allowed to create treaties, in-
cluding treaties that establish international organizations, that contain provi-
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Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, ¶ 346, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 
(Apr. 13, 2006) (emphasis omitted); see also Daugirdas, supra note 208, at 27 (stating that “it is per-
fectly clear that states cannot enter into treaties that violate jus cogens norms. Jus cogens norms bind 
[international organizations] because states cannot, by treaty, establish [international organizations] 
that are authorized to violate jus cogens norms”) (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted). 
 224 Daugirdas, supra note 208, at 5. 
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sions that differ from non-jus cogens customary international law. The ICJ has 
concluded, for example, that “it is well understood that . . . rules of interna-
tional law can, by agreement, be derogated from in particular cases, or as be-
tween particular parties.”225 Others note that “a rule established by agreement 
supersedes for them a prior inconsistent rule of customary international 
law.”226 In fact, “[m]odification of customary law by agreement is not uncom-
mon.”227 The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, for example, allows 
coastal states the right to designate an exclusive economic zone in which the 
coastal state has sovereign rights to natural resources up to 200 nautical miles 
from the coast.228 These provisions superseded customary international law 
that made resources beyond twelve nautical miles from a coast part of the 
global commons and not subject to sovereign rights.229 
Thus, international organizations normally will be bound by non-jus co-
gens customary international law. However, they may “opt out” or, stated dif-
ferently, “contract around” such law.230 This could occur when a treaty is draft-
ed or when an international organization creates rules for itself. In the case of 
an international organization like the IWC, the establishment of binding regu-
lations would be the strongest way to opt out of non-jus cogens customary law, 
if so desired. 
C. The Non-Applicability of Treaty Law to International Organizations 
For at least two reasons, obligations found in human rights treaties (or 
other treaties) that have not become customary international law do not bind 
international organizations.231 First, such treaty law does not apply directly to 
international organizations because they have not consented to be bound by 
those treaties. Second, such treaty law does not apply indirectly to international 
organizations through the obligations of the member states because this would 
create de facto obligations on those states that have joined the international 
organization but have not consented to be bound by the human rights treaty; 
                                                                                                                           
 225 North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den.; Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 72 (Feb. 20). 
Similarly, the International Law Commission has stated the following: “That treaty rules enjoy priori-
ty over custom is merely an incident of the fact that most of general international law is jus disposi-
tivum so that parties are entitled to derogate from it by establishing specific rights or obligations to 
govern their behaviour.” Koskenniemi, supra note 223, ¶ 79. 
 226 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 cmt. j (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
 227 Id. § 102 n.4. 
 228 UNCLOS, supra note 206, arts. 56–57. 
 229 See R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 8–10 (2nd ed. 1988) (noting that, 
prior to the recognition of 200-mile exclusive economic zones, the customary international law norm 
allowed only a three-mile or twelve-mile territorial sea). 
 230 Daugirdas, supra note 208, at 5, 41. 
 231 Much more can be said about why treaty obligations do not apply to international organiza-
tions. For a more detailed discussion, see Daugirdas, supra note 208, at 30–40, 53–58. 
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such an outcome is inconsistent with the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties. 
International organizations are not bound directly by treaties as a matter 
of treaty law because treaties are binding only on those that have given their 
consent to be bound by the treaty. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties provides that “[a] treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a 
third State without its consent.”232 Similarly, the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations or Between 
International Organizations, although not in force, provides that “[a] treaty 
does not create either obligations or rights for a third . . . organization without 
the consent of that . . . organization.”233 Because international organizations 
such as the IWC are not typically parties to treaties, including human rights 
treaties, they are not bound by those treaties.234 
Nonetheless, some scholars have written that treaty-based obligations can 
bind international organizations because the organizations are bound indirectly 
by their member states’ treaty obligations.235 Under this theory, a member state 
may not transfer to an international organization “more powers than those 
which it possesses.”236 Thus, if states are bound by certain treaty obligations, 
they may not create organizations that have the capacity to violate those obli-
gations.237 
This theory, however, violates the principle established in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties that a state must consent to be bound by a 
treaty. Consider the situation of a state that has joined an international organi-
zation but has not consented to be bound by a treaty that other members of the 
international organization have ratified. If treaty obligations follow a state into 
the international organizations that it joins, then those treaty obligations also 
                                                                                                                           
 232 Vienna Convention, supra note 35, art. 34. 
 233 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations or 
Between International Organizations art. 34, opened for signature Mar. 21, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 543 (not 
yet in force). 
 234 See Handl, supra note 209, at 659 (stating that, in the context of international organizations 
like multilateral development banks (MDBs) such as the World Bank, “any attempt at extending the 
reach of treaty provisions to MDBs raises the issue of ‘third organizations’: in respect of the banks, 
these [multilateral environmental agreements] represent res inter alios acta or, put differently, are not 
capable of binding the organization concerned without its consent”). 
 235 See Frédéric Mégret & Florian Hoffmann, The UN as Human Rights Violator? Some Reflec-
tions on the United Nations Changing Human Rights Responsibilities, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 314, 318 
(2003) (describing the position that the United Nations is bound by international human rights stand-
ards “as a result and to the extent that its members are bound”). 
 236 Olivier de Schutter, Human Rights and the Rise of International Organizations: The Logic of 
Sliding Scales in the Law of International Responsibility, in ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 
VIOLATIONS BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 51, 62 (Jan Wouters et al. eds., 2010). 
 237 Id. at 62–63. At least one scholar has developed a new theory of international law develop-
ment in an attempt to make certain principles of treaty law applicable to international organizations. 
See, e.g., Handl, supra note 209, at 660–61. 
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implicitly bind other member states of the organization that have not consented 
to be bound by the treaty.238 
Even if all the states to a new international organization are also party to a 
treaty, say Treaty Q, nothing prevents the member states from establishing 
rules inconsistent with those in Treaty Q. The Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties states that “[w]hen all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also 
to the later treaty but the earlier treaty is not terminated or suspended in opera-
tion under article 59, the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its provi-
sions are compatible with those of the later treaty.”239 The International Law 
Commission has succinctly stated that “the parties to the earlier treaty are al-
ways competent to abrogate it, whether in whole or in part, by concluding an-
other treaty with that object.”240 
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF  
ABORIGINAL SUBSISTENCE WHALING 
The right to cultural integrity and the right to lands, territories, and re-
sources are customary international law, and this Section assumes that the right 
to self-determination in the context of indigenous peoples is also customary 
international law. However, these rights are not jus cogens norms of customary 
international law.241 As such, these rights bind the IWC unless the IWC mem-
bers opt out of them through a regulation included in the schedule. Moreover, 
even if the IWC does not opt out of them, it can interfere with those rights 
without infringing them. As described below, the Human Rights Committee 
has allowed restrictions on the right to cultural integrity that are subject to a 
                                                                                                                           
 238 In its commentary to draft article 24, the International Law Commission stated that “[t]he 
principle which the Vienna Convention lays down is only the expression of one of the fundamental 
consequences of consensuality. It has been adapted without difficulty to treaties to which one or more 
international organizations are parties.” Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of 
its 34th Session, supra note 220, art. 24 cmt. 
 239 Vienna Convention, supra note 35, art. 30(3). This provision assumes an irreconcilable con-
flict. In many cases, treaties can be reconciled. For example, Article XI of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade prohibits restrictions on the importation of goods. General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade art. XI, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. CITES prohibits trade for primarily 
commercial purposes in specimens of species included in Appendix I. CITES, supra note 7, art. 
3(3)(c). While these provisions appear to conflict, they can be reconciled through the GATT’s excep-
tion for measures “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health.” See General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade, supra note, art. XX(b). 
 240 Humphrey Waldock, Third Report on the Law of Treaties, [1964] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 38, 
art. 65 cmt. 14, U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/SER.A/1964/ADD.1. 
 241 In two reports, the International Law Association never suggested that these rights are jus 
cogens norms. It did, however, state that the prohibition against genocide was a jus cogens norm and 
that a treaty is to be considered as extinguished only when a later incompatible norm is of jus cogens 
character. See Int’l Law Ass’n, The Hague Conference, supra note 74, at 51; Int’l Law Ass’n, Sofia 
Conference, supra note 65, at 17. Thus, it can be assumed the association’s failure to identify any 
indigenous rights as jus cogens norms was not an oversight. 
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reasonable and objective justification. The Inter-American Human Rights 
Commission has allowed restrictions on the right to lands that are necessary, 
legitimate, and proportional. 
The ICRW itself does not expressly or implicitly opt out of human rights 
norms or other customary international law norms. Neither does paragraph 13 
of the schedule, which includes the basic framework for ASW, nor any other 
provision of the schedule.242 The question, then, is whether the IWC’s current 
approach to ASW is consistent with these human rights norms. 
A. The IWC’s ASW Decision-Making Process 
The IWC manages ASW using a multi-step process incorporated in reso-
lutions and the terms of reference for various committees. First, the Scientific 
Committee’s Standing Working Group on Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling de-
velops a strike limit algorithm243 for a specific stock; using the specific algo-
rithm, it evaluates proposed ASW strike limits based on the best scientific in-
formation available to determine whether the proposed strike limit will harm 
the stock.244 Second, the Scientific Committee reviews the information provid-
ed by the Standing Working Group and advises the Commission on the pro-
posed strike limits and, for Greenland, which seeks a tonnage of whale meat 
rather than a specific number of whales, determines how many tons of edible 
products can be obtained from an individual whale of a specific species.245 
Third, the IWC’s Aboriginal Substance Whaling Sub-committee considers the 
Scientific Committee’s report and reviews information on subsistence need 
provided by proponent governments.246 Fourth, the ASW Sub-committee then 
makes its recommendation to the Commission in plenary session, which either 
accepts the proposed schedule amendment by consensus or moves to a vote.247 
While the first two steps assess scientific factors only, the third and fourth 
steps take into account aboriginal subsistence need and other non-scientific 
factors. The terms of reference for the ASW Sub-committee direct it to: 
[C]onsider relevant information and documentation from the Scientific 
Committee, and to consider nutritional, subsistence and cultural needs 
relating to aboriginal subsistence whaling and the use of whales taken for 
such purposes, and to provide advice on the dependence of aboriginal 
                                                                                                                           
 242 See ICRW, supra note 5; Schedule, supra note 5, ¶ 13. 
 243 A Strike Limit Algorithm (SLA) represents a conservative approach to setting strike limits for 
each hunt and species. It assumes that all struck whales die, even though this might not be the case. 
Scientific Advice on Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling, INT’L WHALING COMMISSION, https://iwc.int/
scientific-advice-on-aboriginal-subsistence-whalin [https://perma.cc/KJ2C-NKQN]. 
 244 Donovan, supra note 9, at 1–3. 
 245 Id. at 2. 
 246 Id. at 2 fig.1b. 
 247 Id. at 4. 
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communities on specific whale stocks to the Commission for its consid-
eration and determination of appropriate management measures.248 
While the terms of reference direct the ASW Sub-committee to consider 
need, no documents establish criteria for documenting need, except in the case 
of bowhead whales for indigenous groups in the United States. The 1979 Reso-
lution on Bering Sea Bowhead Whales provides the following: 
The Commission intends that the needs of the aboriginals of the 
United States shall be determined by the Government of the United 
States of America. This need shall be documented annually to the 
Technical Committee, and shall be based upon the following factors: 
1. importance of the bowhead in the traditional diet, 
2. possible adverse effects of shifts to non-native foods, 
3. availability and acceptability of other food sources, 
4. historical take, 
5. the integrative functions of the bowhead hunt in contemporary 
Eskimo society, and the risk to the community identity from an 
imposed restriction on native harvesting of the bowhead; and 
6. to the extent possible, ecological considerations.249 
In addition, the 1980 IWC Resolution on the Documentation of Aboriginal 
Need directed relevant IWC members to “document annually for the infor-
mation of the Commission: the utilisation of the meat and products of any 
whales taken for aboriginal/subsistence purposes.”250  Although this 1980 reso-
lution does not establish criteria for a need statement, either in terms of what a 
need statement should include or how it should be evaluated, the resolution 
does appear designed to require a justification of need.251 
Since the adoption of these two resolutions, IWC members have devel-
oped a consistent practice of submitting a “need statement” on behalf of their 
relevant indigenous groups at least sixty days prior to an annual meeting of the 
                                                                                                                           
 248 Int’l Whaling Comm’n, Chairman’s Report of the Forty-Ninth Annual Meeting, 48 REP. INT’L 
WHALING COMMISSION 17, 31 (1998) (emphasis omitted). 
 249 Int’l Whaling Comm’n, Resolution of the International Whaling Commission 31st Annual 
Meeting, July 1979, 30 ANN. REP. INT’L WHALING COMMISSION app. 4, at 35 (1980). 
 250 Int’l Whaling Comm’n, Resolution on the Documentation of Aboriginal Need, Chairman’s 
Report of the Thirty-Second Annual Meeting, 31 ANN. REP. INT’L WHALING COMMISSION app. 3, at 
29 (1981). 
 251 Greg Donovan, the Secretariat’s Head of Science, has written that “this wording appears to 
relate more to the nature of use rather than a justification of need, despite the accompanying text in the 
Chairman’s report.” Donovan, supra note 9, at 3 n.2. That may be so, but the report specifically states 
that relevant governments “should document the needs,” which indicates that the resolution was de-
signed to require a justification of need. Int’l Whaling Comm’n, Chairman’s Report of the Thirty-
Second Annual Meeting, supra note 250, at 18. 
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IWC.252 Without a need statement or some other mechanism to assess need, the 
IWC may not be able to take a decision concerning an ASW quota because 
paragraph 13 of the schedule allows an ASW quota “to satisfy aboriginal sub-
sistence need.”253 
When ASW quotas are introduced in plenary sessions of the IWC for dis-
cussion and decision, an indigenous representative frequently introduces the 
issue formally by describing the cultural and subsistence needs of the group.254 
Representatives of indigenous groups may also take the floor as observers to 
comment on proposals.255 After discussion, the members take a decision to 
approve an ASW quota, which requires a three-fourths majority vote.256 ASW 
quotas are approved in six-year blocks.257 
B. The IWC’s Process Is Likely Sufficient to Implement the Human Rights 
Obligations of the IWC or Its Members 
The IWC’s decision-making process for ASW quotas is likely sufficient 
to implement the human rights obligations of the IWC or its member states. 
They either have “a reasonable and objective justification,”258 as required by 
                                                                                                                           
 252 See Int’l Whaling Comm’n, Rules of Procedure and Financial Regulations as Amended by the 
Commission at the 66th Meeting, § J(1) (2016), https://archive.iwc.int/pages/view.php?ref=3605&k= 
[https://perma.cc/F3XE-SD4M] [hereinafter Int’l Whaling Comm’n, Rules of Procedure]. The Rules 
of Procedure provide that: 
No item of business which involves amendment of the Schedule to the Convention, 
recommendations under Article VI of the Convention, or Resolutions of the Commis-
sion, shall be the subject of decisive action by the Commission unless the full draft text 
has been circulated to the Commissioners at least 60 days in advance of the meeting at 
which the matter is to be discussed. 
Id. 
 253 Schedule, supra note 5, ¶ 13(a). 
 254 See Int’l Whaling Comm’n, Chair’s Report of the 65th Meeting, supra note 30, at 8 & n.6 
(noting that the term “Denmark (Greenland)” was used in the report when a Greenlandic representa-
tive on the Danish delegation intervened and reporting that the many comments made by a Greenland-
ic representative); Int’l Whaling Comm’n, Chair’s Report of the 64th Annual Meeting, supra note 29, 
at 17 (reporting that Ane Hansen, Greenland’s Minister of Fisheries, Hunting and Agriculture present-
ed the background to Greenland’s request for an ASW quota, which was followed by a statement from 
Leif Fontaine, Chairman of the Organisation of Fishermen and Hunters of Greenland) & 22 (reporting 
that Greenland’s Minister of Fisheries, Hunting and Agriculture and the chairman of the Organisation 
of Fishermen and Hunters of Greenland introduced various aspects of Greenland’s request for an 
ASW quota); Int’l Whaling Comm’n, Chair’s Report of the 62nd Annual Meeting, supra note 26, at 
17 (reporting that Greenland presented its request for an ASW quota to the IWC). 
 255 See, e.g., Int’l Whaling Comm’n, Chair’s Report of the 65th Meeting, supra note 30, at 7, 11 
(reporting the comments of the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission). 
 256 ICRW, supra note 5, art. III(2) (requiring a three-fourths majority of those members voting to 
adopt amendments to the schedule). 
 257 See Schedule, supra note 5, ¶ 13(b); see also Donovan, supra note 9, at 1. 
 258 Lovelace v. Canada, Human Rights Committee, Comm. No. R.6/24, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. A/36/40 
(1981). 
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the Human Rights Committee, or are necessary, legitimate, and proportional, 
as required by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.  
1. IWC Management of ASW Generally and the Review of Strike Limits 
The IWC is responsible for regulating whaling “to ensure proper and ef-
fective conservation and development of whale stocks”259 and it may authorize 
regulations that “are necessary to carry out the objectives and purposes of this 
Convention and to provide for the conservation, development, and optimum 
utilization of the whale resources.”260 The IWC has this responsibility and au-
thority throughout “all waters in which whaling is prosecuted by such factory 
ships, land stations, and whale catchers.”261 
The importance of a single body to manage whale resources is apparent 
when the geographic range of whale species is considered. For example, the 
stock of bowhead whales hunted off West Greenland is shared with Canada, 
where some individuals are killed.262 The North Pacific stock of gray whales 
hunted by Russian Chukotkans is found in Mexico, Russia, and the United 
States.263 The Bering-Chukchi-Beaufort Seas stock of bowhead whale is shared 
between Russia and the United States.264 Given the range of potential mortality 
vectors, such as chemical and noise pollution, entanglement, vessel strikes, 
disease, strandings, climate change, marine debris, and direct mortality from 
hunting, the conservation and management of whale stocks is best served by a 
single entity like the IWC. 
From this perspective, management by the IWC and the review of strike 
limits by the Scientific Committee have both a reasonable and objective justi-
fication. Without such management and review, the IWC would have great dif-
ficulty meeting its duty to conserve and develop whale stocks. Moreover, these 
requirements do not deny indigenous peoples their means of survival. In fact, 
they can be viewed as means to ensure that indigenous peoples have a long-
term means of survival because the IWC is managing shared stocks for their 
sustainability in perpetuity. 
Management by the IWC and the review of strike limits by the Scientific 
Committee is also necessary, legitimate, and proportional. These rules are nec-
essary to ensure that utilization of whale resources is sustainable; the history of 
                                                                                                                           
 259 ICRW, supra note 5, pmbl. 
 260 Id. art. V(2)(a). 
 261 Id. art. I(2). 




 263 Id. §§ 9.2, 10.7.2. 
 264 Id. § 9.3. 
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whaling shows the conservation problems associated with inadequate regula-
tion and management.265 The conservation and management of important re-
sources such as whales is clearly legitimate. Moreover, the measures are pro-
portional—that is, they are closely adjusted to the attainment of a legitimate 
objective. In fact, ASW management and strike limits are specifically designed 
to ensure the long-term sustainability of ASW. 
2. The Requirement to Submit a Need Statement 
The IWC’s requirement that an IWC member submit a need statement on 
behalf of one of its aboriginal groups can be traced to the ICRW’s inception in 
1946, when negotiators agreed that the ICRW would allow whaling “for local 
consumption by aborigines.”266 This requirement is expressly incorporated into 
paragraph 13 of the schedule. As a means to demonstrate that the meat is need-
ed for local consumption, paragraph 13 of the schedule allows ASW “to satisfy 
aboriginal subsistence need.”267 
In the context of shared whale populations and rules for ASW that are 
more permissive than for commercial whaling, the need-statement requirement 
can be seen as having both a reasonable and objective justification. This is es-
pecially true because the right to culture—together with the right to traditional 
land, territories, and resources—includes the right to subsistence. Thus, a re-
quirement to submit a need statement can be reasonably and objectively justi-
fied in relation to the nature of the right. Moreover, the requirement does not 
deny indigenous peoples of their means of survival. The need statement is de-
signed to ensure that there are links between the killing of whales, the cultural 
identity of the indigenous peoples, and subsistence needs. 
The need-statement requirement is also necessary, legitimate, and propor-
tional. It is necessary as a means to demonstrate that the ASW quota “sat-
isf[ies] aboriginal subsistence need.”268 The objective of ensuring that ASW 
actually fulfills need is surely legitimate in light of paragraph 13’s requirement 
to allow ASW only to satisfy need.269 Moreover, the requirement is proportion-
al because the need statement directly relates to the legitimate goal of ensuring 
that an ASW hunt fulfills subsistence need. 
                                                                                                                           
 265 A large number of articles describe the decimation of whale populations due to inadequate 
management. See, e.g., Anthony D’Amato & Sudhir K. Chopra, Whales: Their Emerging Right to 
Life, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 21 (1990). 
 266 Schedule, supra note 5, ¶ 13(b)(1); see also supra Section II (describing the history of ASW in 
more detail). 
 267 Schedule, supra note 5, ¶ 13(a). 
 268 Id. 
 269 See id. 
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3. Rejection of an ASW Quota 
In some years, the IWC has rejected ASW quotas. In some of these cases, 
the concern of some IWC members was the scientific basis for, and thus the 
sustainability of, the hunt. At other times, members questioned aspects of the 
need statement of the indigenous peoples seeking the ASW quota. 
For example, in 1977 the IWC rejected a U.S. request for an ASW quota 
for bowhead whales due to concerns about the size of the hunt, the hunt’s im-
pact on populations, and inadequate surveillance and enforcement measures to 
ensure that ASW hunts on bowheads complied with the ICRW.270 The IWC 
rejected Greenland’s request for an ASW quota starting with the 2013 sea-
son271 due to concerns of some IWC members over the size of the quota, 
Greenland’s conversion factors, and evidence of the commercial sale of whale 
meat, including in restaurants.272 The IWC also rejected Greenland’s request 
for a new humpback whale ASW quota in 2008 because some members 
thought Greenland’s need statement “needed to be updated and reassessed,”273 
while others had questions about Greenland’s conversion factors.274 
The IWC’s rejection of ASW hunts due to concerns about the sustainabil-
ity of the hunt provides both a reasonable and objective justification for re-
stricting the rights to culture and resources. Consistent with the IWC’s task of 
conserving and developing whale resources, the IWC must determine whether 
a hunt of a certain size is sustainable. If the IWC, using the relevant strike limit 
algorithm to determine the total allowable catch, rejects an ASW quota as un-
sustainable, that decision would be supported by a reasonable and objective 
justification. For similar reasons, rejection of an ASW quota can also be 
viewed as necessary, legitimate, and proportional. 
The IWC’s rejection of ASW hunts due to concerns as to the extent of 
need are more questionable because one could argue that, without criteria for 
preparing and evaluating need statements, those decisions do not contain a 
“reasonable and objective justification.” Nonetheless, IWC discussions in re-
                                                                                                                           
 270 Int’l Whaling Comm’n, Chairman’s Report of the Twenty-Ninth Meeting, 28 ANN. REP. INT’L 
WHALING COMMISSION 18, 22 (1978) (noting that five recognized stocks should retain their protec-
tion stock status). 
 271 See Press Release, Int’l Whaling Comm’n, supra note 10 (discussing the impasse within the 
IWC over Greenland with a vote of twenty-five to thirty-four with three abstentions). 
 272 See Int’l Whaling Comm’n, Chair’s Report of the 64th Annual Meeting, supra note 29, at 22 
(describing concern from Brazil, Ecuador, and Argentina over Greenland’s ASW whaling practices). 
 273 Int’l Whaling Comm’n, Chair’s Report of the 60th Annual Meeting, 2008 ANN. REP. INT’L 
WHALING COMMISSION 22 (statement of Slovenia speaking on behalf of the European Union). The 
Buenos Aires Group of Latin American IWC members also had concerns about Greenland’s need 
statement. Id. at 20. 
 274 Id. at 23 (statement of Argentina). The proposed amendment to add ten humpback whales to 
Greenland’s ASW quota failed by a vote of twenty-nine votes in favor, thirty-six against, and two 
abstentions. Id. 
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cent years concerning need have focused on the issues of conversion factors,275 
the total size of the proposed ASW quota relevant to need,276 and certain com-
mercial elements of the hunt.277 In other words, the main issues are well 
known. These issues also derive from the 1979 Resolution on Bering Sea 
Bowhead Whales and the 1980 Resolution on the Documentation of Aboriginal 
Need. Thus, even though consideration of these issues is not formally de-
scribed as a requirement for a need statement, IWC members and indigenous 
groups are on notice of the expectations for preparing a need statement. Still, 
this part of the ASW decision-making process could be strengthened. 
4. Participation 
As noted in Section III, participation is a crucial element of implementing 
indigenous rights.278 As stated elsewhere in this article, UNDRIP requires 
states to “consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples con-
cerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their 
free, prior and informed consent before adopting and implementing legislative 
or administrative measures that may affect them.”279 However, free, prior in-
formed consent has not become customary international law.280 Nonetheless, 
UNDRIP requires states, and by extension, international organizations, to es-
                                                                                                                           
 275 Conversion factors have been discussed in 2008, 2012, and 2014. See Int’l Whaling Comm’n, 
Chair’s Report of the 64th Annual Meeting, supra note 29, at 22 (statements of Dominican Republic 
and Brazil); Int’l Whaling Comm’n, Chair’s Report of the 62nd Annual Meeting, supra note 26, at 19; 
Int’l Whaling Comm’n, Chair’s Report of the 60th Annual Meeting, supra note 273, at 23 (statements 
of Argentina and Mexico). 
 276 The EU noted in 2008 that it had examined the need statement of Greenland but could not 
support Greenland’s request for an ASW quota of ten humpback whales, stating that information 
about Greenland’s subsistence needs must be “updated and reassessed.” Int’l Whaling Comm’n, 
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 277 See Int’l Whaling Comm’n, Chair’s Report of the 65th Meeting, supra note 30, at 11 (noting 
the comments on commerciality of Argentina on behalf of the “Buenos Aires Group,” which compris-
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tablish “[w]ays and means of ensuring participation of indigenous peoples on 
issues affecting them.”281 
This article concludes that the participation of indigenous peoples in the 
ASW process is sufficient. Indigenous people have the ability to participate in 
the decisions of the IWC, with representatives of indigenous groups either 
formally presenting a proposal for an ASW quota282 or making interventions to 
support and justify an ASW quota.283  
The situation in the IWC is very similar to Mahuika v. New Zealand284 
and Länsman v. Finland.285 In those two cases, the participation of indigenous 
peoples in the process leading to restrictions on their rights helped the Human 
Rights Committee reach the conclusion that no violation of human rights oc-
curred. Because indigenous peoples have a voice in the ASW decisionmaking 
process, the IWC may be shielded from a finding of violation. 
C. Options for Strengthening the Implementation of  
Human Rights at the IWC 
Although the IWC’s current approach to ASW does not violate indige-
nous rights, options may exist to strengthen the implementation of these rights 
in the IWC’s decision-making. This Article concludes by describing four of 
these options. 
First, the decisions of the IWC relating to need would be more defensi-
ble—that is, subject to “reasonable and objective justification”—if a resolution 
or schedule amendment defined the criteria by which need is judged. The 1979 
and 1980 resolutions provide the basis for those criteria. Questions remain as 
to how specific those criteria should be. As the workshop presenters noted, the 
needs of various indigenous groups differ.286 Establishing criteria that are both 
general enough to accommodate the different needs of indigenous groups and 
                                                                                                                           
 281 UNDRIP, supra note 43, art. 41. 
 282 See supra note 254. 
 283 See, e.g., Int’l Whaling Comm’n, Chair’s Report of the 65th Meeting, supra note 30, at 10 
(reporting the comments of the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission). 
 284 See Mahuika v. New Zealand, Human Rights Committee, Comm. No. 547/1993, U.N. Doc. 
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 285 See Länsman v. Finland, Human Rights Committee, Comm. No. 511/1992, ¶ 3.1, U.N. Doc. 
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 286 See Int’l Whaling Comm’n, Report of the IWC Expert Workshop on Aboriginal Subsistence 
Whaling (ASW), supra note 6, § 5.2.2. The workshop agreed that:  
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Id. Consequently, the Workshop recommended that guidance on need statements “must be sufficiently 
flexible to account for the different circumstances for each hunt.” Id. § 8 para. (c). 
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specific enough to limit IWC discretion will be challenging. In preparing such 
criteria, a working group that includes IWC members, relevant indigenous 
groups, and members of observer organizations would be beneficial, as these 
different stakeholders would bring unique expertise to the task. One task of the 
ASW workshop was to “develop a proposal or options for addressing those 
[ASW] issues including a broad consideration of the issue of ‘standardised 
need statements,’” but it did not happen.287 Nonetheless, including indigenous 
groups in the working group would also satisfy the consultation provisions of 
UNDRIP to the extent that current participation is considered inadequate. Their 
inclusion would also implement one of the recommendations of the ASW 
Workshop.288 
Second, a process for reconsideration of rejected ASW proposals should 
be included in the IWC’s Rules of Procedure or Rules of Debate.289 The Rules 
of Procedure and Rules of Debate neither expressly allow nor preclude recon-
sideration of a vote. The IWC should amend its rules to clarify that under cer-
tain circumstances it may reconsider a decision. Take, for example, the rejec-
tion of Greenland’s quota in 2012. If the IWC had included a process for re-
considering decisions, then, after the IWC rejected Greenland’s ASW quota, 
Greenland (and Denmark on its behalf) could have amended its proposal to 
take into account the concerns of some members and requested another vote. 
This process has been invaluable within the context of CITES, and similar 
rules for “reopening debate” also exist in the Convention on Migratory Species 
of Wild Animals (CMS). Rule 11 of the CMS Rules of Procedure provides as 
follows: 
(3)  Whenever the Conference considers a recommendation origi-
nating in plenary session, where the discussion of the recommenda-
tion has been conducted with interpretation in the three working 
languages, it may be reconsidered during the meeting only under the 
following circumstances. 
(4)  Any Representative, if seconded by a Representative of another 
Party, may present a motion for the reopening of debate. Permission 
to speak on the motion shall be granted only to the Representative 
presenting it and the seconder, and to a Representative of each of 
two Parties wishing to speak against the motion, after which the mo-
tion shall immediately be put to a vote. A motion to reopen the de-
bate shall be granted if two-thirds of the Representatives present and 
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 288 See Int’l Whaling Comm’n, Report of the IWC Expert Workshop on Aboriginal Subsistence 
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voting support the motion. While speaking on a motion to reopen 
the debate, a Representative may not speak on the substance of the 
decision itself.290 
If such a rule existed within the IWC Rules of Procedure or Rules of Debate, 
the rejection of a quota could be reconsidered. An IWC member would reopen 
debate in accordance with the new rule and, if successful in reopening debate, 
the members would take another vote. If it were clear that the original proposal 
would not be accepted, the proponent could reopen debate and then amend its 
proposal consistent with Rule E of the Rules of Debate. Such a rule would ap-
ply to all decisions of the members, not just votes on ASW quotas, unless so 
limited. However, ASW quotas provide the most relevant context for consider-
ing such an amendment to the Rules of Debate because it would provide an 
avenue for safeguarding the rights of indigenous peoples. To further safeguard 
these rights, the rule should specify that only the proponent can propose an 
amendment to its proposal for an ASW catch limit.  
Third, the ASW workshop report recommended that need statements be 
submitted only when needed to account for new information rather than every 
six years.291 On the one hand, this would be consistent with a right to subsist-
ence and reduce the burden on indigenous communities. On the other hand, it 
would be inconsistent with the IWC’s treatment of ASW whaling as an excep-
tion. It might also be a way to avoid reporting on changes in consumption pat-
terns. While it is clear that indigenous communities may evolve and that such 
evolution does not change their status as indigenous peoples, such evolution 
could lead to greater consumption of whale products just as easily as less con-
sumption. To accommodate both the rights of indigenous peoples and the duty 
of the IWC to manage whale stocks, a hybrid approach could be established 
that requires a new need statement only when there is new information to con-
sider but, if there is no new information to consider, requires an affirmative 
statement that no changes have occurred since the last need statement was 
submitted. 
Fourth, the ASW workshop report also suggested that discussions related 
to need begin two years before a quota renewal year to prevent surprises.292 A 
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two-year period seems overly long given how rarely ASW quotas are rejected. 
The IWC could consider a requirement that relevant member states, on behalf 
of their indigenous groups, submit a need statement (or an affirmative state-
ment that need has not changed, if the previous recommendation is adopted), 
150 days prior to the beginning of an annual meeting rather than the current 
requirement of sixty days. IWC members would then be required to submit any 
comments and concerns on the proposal at least sixty days before the meeting 
to give the indigenous group, as well as all IWC members, the opportunity to 
reflect on those concerns. 
CONCLUSION 
The question of whether international organizations have a duty to im-
plement human rights norms has only recently received attention with that at-
tention focused on ASW in the IWC. In 2015, Greenland hosted a workshop at 
which presenters posited that the IWC had a duty to interpret the ICRW in light 
of those human rights norms that have become customary international law, 
specifically, the rights to self-determination, cultural identity, and lands, terri-
tories, and resources. The basic claim made at the workshop—that these rights 
have become customary international law—is essentially correct, although it is 
not yet clear that the right to self-determination in the context of indigenous 
peoples has become customary international law. 
This article moves the discussion forward by providing a legal theory that 
explains why international organizations have an obligation to implement cus-
tomary international human rights law. It concludes that customary interna-
tional law binds international organizations such as the IWC either directly or 
indirectly because the member states composing the international organization 
have individual responsibilities to implement them or because the Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties requires that treaties be interpreted in light of 
evolving customary international law. More specifically, jus cogens norms of 
customary international law bind international organizations all the time be-
cause these norms cannot be derogated from; however, none of the human 
rights norms discussed in this report have attained the status of jus cogens. In 
contrast, non-jus cogens norms of customary international law—such as those 
embodied in the rights to self-determination, cultural identity, and lands, terri-
tories, and resources—bind international organizations unless they decide oth-
erwise. International law is clear that states and international organizations 
may adopt treaties or otherwise establish rules inconsistent with customary 
international law. The IWC may do so through binding regulations or other-
wise agreeing to adopt rules inconsistent with customary international law. 
The article also addresses two important limitations in relation to these 
rights. First, the content of these rights is not clear. For example, it is not clear 
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that indigenous peoples have the right to use resources, including marine re-
sources, that they do not currently possess. Second, these rights are not abso-
lute. Actions may interfere with human rights provided that those actions are 
subject to reasonable and objective justification, as the U.N. Human Rights 
Committee has concluded, or are necessary, legitimate, and proportional, as the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights has stated. 
The non-absolute nature of these rights is critical in the case of ASW be-
cause, although the IWC’s current management regime for ASW does affect 
certain customary international human rights, the regime can be reasonably 
and objectively justified or would be considered necessary, legitimate, and 
proportional. This is because the conservation and management of whale re-
sources, particularly those that are shared stocks, requires a single entity like 
the IWC to develop rules for their conservation and management. The re-
quirement for a need statement would seem a reasonable and objective way (or 
a necessary, legitimate, and proportional way) to implement the requirement of 
paragraph 13 of the schedule, which allows ASW “to satisfy aboriginal sub-
sistence need.” Consequently, the IWC’s ASW does not need to be changed. 
Nonetheless, the IWC could take steps to strengthen implementation of human 
rights by, for example, clearly articulating criteria for preparing and evaluating 
need statements. 
  
 
